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COMMUNICATION IN CIVIL-MILITARY
COOPERATION

by

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March 2007

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COMMUNICATION IN CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

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ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) units have become more frequently involved in peace support operations (PSOs). Moreover, they have become more deeply engaged with peoples of different national and organizational cultures. These multicultural peacekeeping environments are rife with communication difficulties. Coordination and cooperation between numerous actors present in the field such as International Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, media, local authorities, tribal leaders and other individuals, has proved to be very challenging. Moreover, considering the nature of contemporary international interventions, any CIMIC staff is required to adapt to a wide range of new, non-military skills which would constitute a necessary “toolbox.” Culturally sensitive communications such as negotiation and media interactions are vital to effective coordination and cooperation in modern peacekeeping. Thus, CIMIC officers must know how to deal with the media; how, despite enormous cultural diversity, to successfully conduct their jobs; how to work efficiently with interpreters; and finally, how to resolve local conflicts using negotiations.

Besides defining these new phenomena influencing CIMIC activities in PSOs, this thesis provides suggestions or basic universal guidelines for soldiers, especially for those acting at the tactical level. At the same time, the thesis should draw the attention of those people responsible for creating and executing the entire pre-deployment training for CIMIC soldiers who are going to be working abroad. The suggestions presented in this thesis will meet current needs for training.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. REDEFINING THE MILITARY'S PRIORITIES

The end of the long lasting Cold War brought enormous changes to the international structure of major powers. Well-known behavioral patterns of adversaries became outdated. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not bring a time of enduring peace to the world. The wars in former Yugoslavia, Chechnya and the 1991 Gulf War proved to be new kinds of wars in their nature; wars which required a totally different and complex approach that demanded redefining the future of armed forces.¹

Military structures which had been created for the purposes of the Cold War are no longer useful. The armed forces of the future will serve as “the guarantors of foreign policies – of states, alliances and the United Nations – which are mainly aimed at stabilization and at pacification.”² Moreover, they are to promote, preserve, and to implement various peace agreements; they guard existing borders and protect against any kind of violence. Global geostrategic changes demanded also the dismissal of confrontation and bipolarity, and the advent of a more cooperative world. Contemporary armies across the world are being trained to be more flexible and effective in very complicated interventions and humanitarian missions where numerous actors must meet and coexist in an uncertain environment.³

Since 1989, peace interventions have been mandated mainly to carry out the implementation of various peace agreements and have resulted in countless challenges faced by UN forces. As Cedric de Coning suggests, the new tasks for military forces are related to “assisting the host country to sustain the momentum of the peace agreement.”⁴ Most of the actions taken by the peacekeepers are aimed not only at sustaining the peace but also at preventing the re-emergence of conflict by addressing the root causes.

¹ Michael Keren, Donald A. Sylvan (ed.), *International Intervention, Sovereignty versus Responsibility*, Frank Cass, London, 2002, 114-115.

² Ibid., 119.

³ Ibid., 121.

⁴ Cedric de Coning, *Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations*, available at: <http://www.trainingforpeace.org/pubs/accord/civmil2005.pdf> (last visited on 13 November 2006).

B. DEFINING NEW MILITARY FUNCTIONS

... peacekeeping is clearly a progression of military professionalism along managerial lines. Being the pragmatic military professional he is, the peace soldier is shaped by the concrete needs and demands of an immediate peacekeeping situation within the limits suited to and tolerated by the international mandate under which he serves. The peace soldier is one who is able to subscribe to the percepts of absolute minimal force, a reliance on compromise and negotiation, and the recognition of the elusiveness of permanent political solutions.⁵

The characteristics of contemporary military forces have been enormously reshaped. Both flexibility and multifunctionality are as crucial for the modern military as firepower and battlefield mobility. Soldiers of the future will have to be able to coexist and cooperate effectively with a multiplicity of actors such as International Organizations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and even the media when engaged in armed conflicts and various Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The new dimensions of military interventions require not only a maximum of flexibility of the commanders and the troops, “but also a multifunctionality for which the soldier has to be trained and equipped.”⁶ The new armed forces will have to be equally prepared for future combat, protection and humanitarian missions which very often will be organized under the mandate of the United Nations and composed of a multinational force.

The role of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) units in the contemporary peace support operations is significantly increased. Moreover, they have become more deeply engaged with people of different national and organizational cultures. This multicultural peacekeeping environment is rife with communication difficulties. Coordination and cooperation between numerous actors present in the field also proves to be very challenging. Thus, considering the nature of contemporary international interventions, CIMIC staff is required to adopt a wide range of new, non-military skills which would constitute a necessary “toolbox.” Cross-cultural communications appears to play a significant role for CIMIC. Thus, CIMIC officers must know how to deal with the media,

⁵ Charles Moskos, Jr. *Peace Soldiers*. The University of Chicago Press, 1976, 137.

⁶ Keren and Sylvan, 122-123.

how, despite enormous cultural diversity, to successfully conduct their job, how to work efficiently with interpreters, and finally, how to resolve local conflicts using negotiations.

Culturally sensitive communication, negotiation, and media interactions are vital to effective coordination and cooperation in modern peacekeeping. Considering the nature of tasks conducted by Civil-Military Cooperation personnel in the peacekeeping environment, both defining major communication obstacles and providing basic guidelines about successful cross-cultural relations can prove very helpful for CIMIC personnel. Thus, defining and describing the major communication challenges and presenting useful hints for CIMIC staff will significantly contribute to the enhancing of CIMIC's performance in the field. Chapter Two of this thesis examines in detail the doctrinal interpretation of CIMIC and the essential purposes of its existence. Clear definition of basic tasks and procedures performed by CIMIC personnel in peacekeeping environment will significantly contribute to the better understanding of CIMIC. Challenges connected with cooperation and coordination between various organizations and the military in PSOs are also discussed in this chapter. Discussions about cooperation and coordination are presented from both the military and the civilian perspective. Following chapters focus on the ways CIMIC personnel currently communicate and should communicate with the civilian community comprising the peacekeeping environment. Chapter Three presents relationships between the media and military with a particular emphasis on CIMIC applications. Moreover, it provides a basic set of guidelines for CIMIC officers on how to deal with the media effectively and how military-media cooperation can become mutually beneficial. Chapter Four describes the role of culture in modern peacekeeping. Relations between international military contingents, differences in organizational cultures, diversity of the host and foreign cultures and finally, language barriers, all these comprise a very complicated peacekeeping cultural *mélange* in which CIMIC personnel act on a daily basis. Chapter Five presents the impact of tactical level negotiation on CIMIC jobs. Considering the nature of CIMIC activities that take part outside of military zones, CIMIC personnel very often encounter situations demanding negotiation skills. Similar to previous chapters, basic guidelines concerning the skills necessary to a micro-negotiator are discussed.

Chapter Six discusses the role of interpreters in the conduct of CIMIC field activities. A distinction is made between the professional interpreters and the ones being hired from the local communities. Advantages and disadvantages of working with local language assistants are discussed. Also, basic hints on how to increase the effectiveness of CIMIC-interpreter relations are provided. Chapter Six underlines the importance of proper education and training for CIMIC personnel. It comprises a set of suggestions which should improve CIMIC communication abilities, thus enhancing the effectiveness of CIMIC performance in future peacekeeping deployments.

C. MODERN PEACEKEEPING – KEY DEFINITIONS

This paper focuses upon UN missions. These include the following, as defined by Otunnu and Doyle:⁷

Peace enforcement – action with or without the consent of the parties to ensure compliance with a cease-fire mandated by the Security Council acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These military forces are comprised of heavily armed, national forces operating under the direction of the Secretary General.

Peacemaking – mediation and negotiations designed to bring hostile parties to agreement through peaceful means such as those found in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Drawing upon judicial settlement, mediation, and other forms of negotiation, UN peacemaking initiatives would seek to persuade parties to arrive at a peaceful settlement of their differences.

Peacekeeping – military and civilian deployments for the sake of establishing a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, as a confidence-building measure to monitor a truce between the parties while diplomats strive to negotiate a comprehensive peace or officials attempt to implement an agreed peace.

Post-conflict peacebuilding – measures organized to foster economic and social cooperation to build confidence among previously warring parties; develop the social, political and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence; and lay the foundations for a durable peace.

⁷ Definitions taken from Olara A. Otunnu, Michael W. Doyle (ed.), *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 1998, 2-3.

II. CIMIC

A. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW PEACEKEEPING

The purpose of this chapter is to present in detail the doctrinal interpretation of CIMIC and the essential functions. Comprehensible definition of basic tasks and procedures performed by CIMIC personnel in a peacekeeping environment will contribute considerably to the better understanding of CIMIC. Challenges connected with cooperation and coordination between various organizations and the military in PSOs are also discussed in this chapter.

With the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping missions increased both in number and size.⁸ The first missions, “first generation peacekeeping” as they have been called, ranged from several hundred to several thousand troops. These troops were mandated to observe, to monitor cease-fires or to separate the fighting parties. Recent peacekeeping operations have not only significantly increased the numbers of troops but also expanded the range of activities carried out during missions. As Rasmussen points out, the size of the force and the kinds of operations undertaken by the peacekeepers are determined “by the nature of the mandate and the level of cooperation from the warring parties.”⁹ In order to provide a long lasting and enduring peace, peacekeeping missions had to be turned into more nonmilitary-oriented dimensions incorporating human rights education and monitoring; supervision of elections; assisting with judicial reform and civil administration; training public officials at various levels of government; providing humanitarian relief; repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; demining; reconciliation; and postconflict reconstruction.¹⁰ Thus, the new “second generation” of peacekeeping has been labeled “peace operations”; the main task now is not only to observe a cease-fire or to separate the warring parties but also to create a friendly atmosphere where a durable peace will be possible.

⁸ J. Lewis Rasmussen in *Peacemaking in International Conflict, Methods & Techniques*, William Zartman, Lewis Rasmussen (ed.), United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 1997, 38.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Quoted in Rasmussen, 38.

Rasmussen suggests that accomplishing a modern peace operation requires a complex intervention strategy which will focus on nine tactical levels simultaneously. Such a multitask approach demands coordinated actions by governments, NGOs, business/commerce, private citizens, research/education and training institutes, advocacy organizations, religious communities, philanthropic organizations, and the media.¹¹ Only collaboration between all these actors present in the modern peacekeeping operations can guarantee the effectiveness of the contemporary peacekeepers, and a lasting peace.

Francis Kofi Abiew in “NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations” also explains that the end of the Cold War brought the demand for “multifunctional/multidimensional peacekeeping” which results in new tasks and the need for coordination between civilian and military actors.¹² As Abiew suggests, the experiences of the last several years prove that the effectiveness of modern peacekeeping will depend mainly on the cooperation between the military and civilians. Abiew argues that given the nature of the “contemporary conflict management and resolution involving military and non-military activities, only a well planned and coordinated combination of civilian and military measures can create the conditions for the long-term stability and peace in divided societies.”¹³ To meet these demands, as Abiew mentions, the military, for its part, has tried to improve relations with NGOs by trying to create and advance Civil-Military Cooperation Centres (CMOCs) and other synchronizing military bodies. Moreover, liaison officers have been dispatched to the main NGOs working in the field. These cooperation improving steps have helped both sides to better coordinate their actions, and also made it much easier to coexist in the complex reality of peace operations. In fact, these new developments did not always prove fully effective and the results of CMOCs’ actions were rather mixed. However, Abiew sees the effectiveness and efficiency of future peace operations through improving these arrangements which can serve as valuable models for future missions.¹⁴

¹¹ Quoted in Rasmussen, 43.

¹² Francis Kofi Abiew, “NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations” in Henry F. Carey, Olivier P. Richmond (ed.), *Mitigating Conflict, The Role of NGOs*, Franc Cass, London, 2003, 24-25.

¹³ Ibid., 25.

¹⁴ Ibid., 35.

In modern peace operations, achieving a long lasting and enduring peace will depend mainly on more non-military oriented dimensions. The number of actors participating in new peace operations has increased enormously. Complexity and multifunctional types of contemporary peace operations have made the military and civilian organizations work closely together which has demanded the creation of CMOCs and military liaisons operating closely within the civilian domain. But, there is still much to be done and many things to be improved. Very often, because of the lack of understanding and field experience, both the military and the civilian organizations struggle while dealing with their “partners” in the field.¹⁵ The reasons for the lack of understanding and the need for better coordination or cooperation between the military and the civilian organizations in peace operations will be developed below.

Jan Eliason in “Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping” also notices the significance of the presence of civilian actors in contemporary peace operations. He sees humanitarian actions as “one of the three pillars of United Nations action” besides peacemaking and peacekeeping and argues that humanitarian assistance should not only be provided by civilian organizations but in coordination and cooperation with military contingents operating in the field. This collaboration between the military and non-military actors can only be fruitful and effective if the appropriate arrangements are considered in the early planning stages of peacekeeping operations. Eliason also points out the importance of integrated training for peacekeeping troops and relief workers.¹⁶ Although the effects of cooperation between the civilian and the military bodies in peace operations can be very fruitful, such cooperation can also bring many new problems connected with the natures of the two different actors.

B. THE CHALLENGES OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

...there is no natural meeting of minds between civilians and the military:
it has to be worked up and coordination is hard work on both sides. Both

¹⁵ United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Training*, United Nations Publications, New York and Geneva, 1998, 5.

¹⁶ Jan Eliason, „Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping” in *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century*, Olara A. Otunnu, Michael W. Doyle (ed.), Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 1998, 211-212.

sides have different roles, different aims, different motives and, what we have to remember, different philosophies, and these need to be reconciled one with the other.

Professor Richard Cohen
Moscow Seminar, March 1998¹⁷

During many peace operations civilian and military bodies have cooperated fruitfully and harmoniously, but in other cases the inability to achieve a proper level of cooperation and coordination critically damaged the efficiency of the mission.¹⁸ The authors of *Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century – Concluding Report 1997-2002* suggest that the reasons fall into the so called “CIMIC issue.” It will be very useful to follow their suggestions and to define and characterize the major sources of cooperation challenges between civilians and the military in the peacekeeping realm. Following are several most important obstacles which can dramatically impede the effectiveness of civil-military cooperation and coordination in the contemporary peacekeeping environment:¹⁹

- Culture – Generally speaking, there is an enormous cultural gap between civilian organizations and the military. While civilian organizations can be characterized as rather “loosely structured, decentralized, consensus-based and, in some cases, anti-bureaucratic and unconventional,” the military organizations “are structured, hierarchical, rigid, authoritarian and orderly;”²⁰
- Resources – While the military peacekeeping forces are usually very well supplied and quickly deployed, the mechanisms of civilian organizations are much slower. Moreover, the humanitarian community is normally dependent on financing from and generally supported by donors. So, civilians very often need the assistance of the military forces in many situations (security, transport, and logistics) – such support needs to be coordinated;
- Authority – Numerous civilian organizations have various authorities at various levels of operation. Some of them act as totally independent organs, some must report to the Head of Mission; some operate in the

¹⁷ Quoted in The Challenges Project, *Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century – Concluding Report 1997-2002*, Elanders Gotab, Stockholm, 2002, 143.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., 146-148.

²⁰ Ibid., 146.

region and report for guidelines to the strategic level. “Military forces, especially those outside the UN chain of command, must report back to regional or sub-regional councils in Vienna, Brussels or elsewhere or to capitals;”²¹ and

- Personalities – Given the personalities’ differences and various length of deployment between the military commanders and the civilian organizations’ representatives, it is common to encounter problems with coordination and cooperation. In addition, civilians as military commanders are often poorly prepared for “either the specific mandate, for management responsibilities, or for the operational environment.”²² So, because the realities of contemporary peacekeeping are very complex and demand permanent coordination and cooperation, an unprepared leader can seriously weaken the ability of both communities acting in the field to achieve appropriate goals.

Misunderstandings are often experienced between civilian organizations and the military when working in the field. Because the military and civilian communities often lack experience in matters of cooperation, misconceptions and expectations on both sides can lead to significant misunderstandings. Here are the most crucial ones:

- The military sometimes wrongly presumes that NGOs can be tasked, while they also have their priorities and clear tasks in mind; also, they are responsible to their donors;
- Civilian organizations also often wrongly expect that the military is there to support them. The military have their own and clear objectives, and simply cannot be everywhere where NGOs expect them to assist; and
- Both civilians and the military blame each other for the lack of proper preparatory training for the mission.

Existing dilemmas between the military and civilian “worlds” also seem to play an important role in smooth cooperation and coordination in the field. What is crucial is that not only the military and humanitarian organizations create these dilemmas. Indigenous societies and warring factions can also seriously hamper the effectiveness of the whole peacekeeping effort. Here are the main dilemmas which military and civilian actors face in modern peacekeeping missions:

²¹ Quoted in The Challenges Project, 147.

²² Ibid.

- As we already know, Civil-Military Cooperation is a necessary tool which guarantees that a contemporary peace operation will meet its expected goals. Unfortunately, in some examples, the local community or parties to a conflict assume that such cooperation should be very limited or perhaps non-existent;
- “Peacekeepers generally strive for impartiality whereas humanitarian providers often insist on neutrality;”²³
- Most of the civilian actors operate independently, while in many examples they ought to cooperate with the military to gain security;
- The military focuses on the objectives of their mission; civilian organizations tend to work for long-term solutions; and
- Sometimes, on the road to win peoples’ “hearts and minds,” not only the military but also humanitarian organizations are doing things “for people rather than with people,” forgetting thus, that there should be time for building enduring capabilities and capacities.²⁴

C. CIMIC DOCTRINE

Changes in the peacekeeping environment where NATO could potentially operate, led to the creation of a special military body, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), which plays and will play a crucial role in peace operations. Since the new demands for the military and the challenges of the civil-military cooperation in peacekeeping missions have been discussed previously, it would be useful to focus on AJP-9, the NATO CIMIC doctrine. The examination of CIMIC theory will elucidate the main priorities of Civil-Military Cooperation. Also, it will be of assistance in appreciating the significance of CIMIC involvement in modern peace operations – especially the role of CIMIC in facilitating coordination and cooperation between various actors working in the field.

According to MC 411/1, NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation, the main task for CIMIC is to facilitate cooperation between the military NATO component and all elements of the civilian community within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). CIMIC is:

²³ Quoted in The Challenges Project, 148.

²⁴ Ibid.

The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.²⁵

D. CIMIC APPLICATION

There are four factors which form the application of CIMIC:

- CIMIC activities constitute an integral part of the mission, and are aimed at achieving a constant and enduring end-state;
- CIMIC staff are integrated into the Commander's Headquarters in order to coordinate CIMIC actions in the JOA;
- NATO forces will, as far as possible and within military capabilities, accommodate and support the numerous civilian organizations in the field; and
- "CIMIC activities are carried out with a view to timely transition those functions to the appropriate civilian organizations or authorities."²⁶

E. THE PURPOSE OF CIMIC

The NATO CIMIC doctrine clearly points out the importance of civilian actors in peace operations and takes into consideration that achieving fruitful cooperation and coordination between the military and civilian organizations can be very challenging. Another challenge for the military will obviously be the presence of the media and the mixture of expectations of "both the international and local communities."²⁷ Thus, the CIMIC doctrine underlines the significance of establishing a net of effective relationships with all actors present in the JOA and argues that these relationships and joint planning are essential for future conflict resolution. CIMIC should be the military organization responsible for "establishing and maintaining" these associations.²⁸ "The long term purpose of CIMIC is to help create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of Alliance objectives in operations."²⁹ To accomplish these goals, AJP-9 determines several actions undertaken by the CIMIC staff which include:

²⁵ MC 411/1 – the NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation, available at: <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/mc411-1-e.htm> (last visited on 20 November 2006).

²⁶ AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine, 1-1 to 1-2, available at: <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/AJP-9.pdf> (last visited on 13 November 2006).

²⁷ Ibid., 1-2.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ MC 411/1.

- having liaison officers on various levels of operation;
- joint planning engagement at various levels, before as well as during an operation (however, it must be noticed, that while such planning mechanisms and associations exist, “it may not always be possible to conduct them on a formal basis”³⁰);
- preparing continuous civil environment assessments, thus identifying existing vacuums and finding ways to fill them;
- providing civilian specialists according to the expected needs;
- working toward “smooth transition;” and
- cooperating with all staff branches and advising the Commander.³¹

Peter Rehse in *CIMIC: Concepts, Definitions and Practice* determined three characteristics which apply to the definition and purpose of CIMIC. First, CIMIC, as a term, “refers to a military operation and not to the civil-military cooperation as such. The military goal remains supreme.”³² Second, facilitating humanitarian aid by NGOs or IOs is not an objective for CIMIC. “Third, the definitions imply that CIMIC is rather a tactical doctrine, not a strategy.”³³ In fact, CIMIC serves only as the Commander’s tool, an instrument to achieve the main objectives of the mission.

F. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

The principles that will be presented here suggest the main ideas for how to create and maintain the mutually beneficial civil-military relations with the key civilian organizations, civilian authorities, and local populations:³⁴

- *Cultural Awareness* – Because even the smallest violation of law or local custom can, in politically sensitive areas, lead to a highly hostile attitude and questioning of the success of the military mission, one of the key CIMIC tasks will be to ensure that the military will acquire a high level of awareness concerning local culture, customs and laws.

³⁰ MC 411/1.

³¹ AJP-9, 1-3.

³² Peter Rehse, *CIMIC: Concepts, Definitions and Practice*, available at: <http://www.ifsh.de/pdf/publikationen/hb/hb136.pdf> (last visited on 13 November 2006), 30.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ AJP-9, 2-1.

- *Common Goals* – While the numerous organizations acting within the JOA may have different immediate goals, in the long run, on the road of strengthening of civil-military relationships, some common objectives can be determined.
- *Shared Responsibility* – After having established the cooperation of civilian organizations, and determined basic common goals, next is to create a basis of shared responsibilities. So, to avoid misunderstandings and to identify various roles and responsibilities, the role of CIMIC will be the establishment of transition mechanisms with the civilian actors acting in the JOA.
- *Transparency* – Because tensions between political, military and civilian actors will often lead to misunderstandings, the role of CIMIC should also be to make its activities transparent, demonstrating competence and capabilities in resolving problems. Only this open behavior can gain them the trust and confidence of the civilian community. Although CIMIC staff that enjoy the confidence of civilians may constitute a valuable source of intelligence for the Commander, “it must be recognized that the information obtained for the purpose of intelligence production cannot always be shared with civilian organizations and authorities,”³⁵ because the fragile trust can easily be lost.
- *Communication* – Permanent communication with the civilian environment is essential for achieving and maintaining successful cooperation. Cultural differences, prejudices and difficulties with defining common goals between military and civilian organizations, can be overcome only by maintaining open communication channels. Thus, the role of CIMIC personnel will be to establish and to keep open the channels of communication with the main civilian organizations acting in the JOA. Moreover, it will also be of great importance to encourage the incoming actors to become accustomed to the existing communication networks.

G. CIMIC CORE FUNCTIONS

As explained earlier, CIMIC constitutes a supportive and integral part of an operation. In order to provide the highest possible level of support, the AJP-9 suggests various core tasks for CIMIC depending on the stage of the mission. During the pre-operational stage the CIMIC staff will mainly assist the force in planning actions connected with civilian actors existing in the JOA. The role of the CIMIC staff will be to make sure all the civilian-related aspects are taken into account during the planning phase of operation. These may include, for example:³⁶

³⁵ AJP-9, 2-3.

³⁶ AJP-9, 3-2.

- Political and cultural history;
- The state of national and local government;
- Civil administration and services;
- The needs of the civilian population;
- The presence, mandates, capabilities and intentions of IOs and NGOs working in the JOA;
- The mind-set and perceptions of the civilian population; and
- Economy, commerce and infrastructure.

The main tasks of CIMIC at the operational stage will be to organize fruitful civil-military cooperation and establish smooth relationships with civilian bodies in order to support the Commander's mission. The most important CIMIC activities at this stage include:³⁷

- *Communication* - to achieve effective cooperation there must be constant communication functioning at all levels;
- *Information exchange* - Passing information back and forth is usually mutually fruitful. Information gathered from the civilian environment is very often of operational relevance;
- *Coordination* – Because numerous actors in the field have various cultures, mandates and objectives, the task of CIMIC will be a constant coordination of activities at all levels;
- *Facilitating agreements* – to support civil-military cooperation, CIMIC staff will help in drawing up any formal agreements; and
- *Assessments and conducting CIMIC activities* – to meet the immediate needs of the local population, or to fill any vacuum existing in the JOA, CIMIC is responsible for preparing constant assessments. Although, the military will react if vacuums arise “due to the mandated civilian authorities’ or the International Community’s temporary inability to fulfill these needs.”³⁸

During the transitional stage of the mission, CIMIC will take part in handing over civil activities to the proper, mandated authorities.

³⁷ AJP-9, 3-2, 3-3.

³⁸ Ibid., 3-3.

The NATO AJP-9 CIMIC Doctrine considers CIMIC tasks related to three core functions.³⁹

- Civil-Military Liaison,
- Support to the civil environment, and
- Support to the Force

“Civil-Military Liaison” relates to providing the coordination required during the planning phase as well as during operations. The early establishment of civil-military relations in the JOA will be a fundamental basis for further fruitful cooperation to develop during the mission. A properly organized public information policy will also be necessary to facilitate coordination with civil authorities. This can be achieved by constant communication of relevant achievements made through CIMIC activities which will result in the support of the population and civilian organizations acting in the JOA.

“Support to the civil environment” is connected to relations with civilian actors during a military operation and consists of a wide range of CIMIC activities. Such support is not usually conducted under the civilian command and involves the engagement of various military resources: information, personnel, material, equipment, communication facilities, specialist expertise and training. As the doctrine explains, generally, these CIMIC activities will only take place when there is a need to support the fulfillment of the Commander’s mission or/and because the proper civil establishment and organizations are unable to perform their tasks (because of the lack of resources or security). The duration, extent of actions, and all of the political, military and civilian factors should be taken into account while making decisions concerning these supporting actions.

“Support to the Force” relates to the situation which requires civil support of the military. This aspect of so called Host Nation Support (HNS) has been also explained in paragraph 7 of the *MC 411/1 the NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation*:

³⁹ AJP-9, 3-3.

HNS seeks to provide the NATO Commander and the sending nations with support available in the form of material, facilities and services including area security and administrative support in accordance with negotiated arrangements between the sending nations and/or NATO and the host government.

HNS may also help to reduce the amount of manpower or various logistic material which will be required during the next phases of the mission. Also important is that, HNS cannot disrupt the local resources' capacities.

The military will often require access to local civilian resources. In such circumstances every effort will be made to avoid adverse impact on local populations, economies, environment, infrastructure or the work of the humanitarian organizations.⁴⁰

So, one of the main tasks of the CIMIC staff will be monitoring the situation in the JOA by preparing constant assessments concerning available resources, acting civilian organizations, and their goals and capabilities in the area.

H. CIMIC GROUPS AND CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTRES (CMOCS)

Because the structure of the CIMIC component in most cases will depend on the requirements of the particular mission, every CIMIC organization should be flexible enough to meet these expectations. As the AJP-9 explains, the size and the structure of CIMIC staff integrated with HQs will be different depending on the demands of the situation. Thus, the main requirement for CIMIC will be keeping a sustainable level of prepared staff in order to conduct CIMIC activities in the JOA in different environments.

1. CIMIC Groups

A CIMIC Group is, in composition, the biggest CIMIC unit that may be deployed as a "part of a national contingent or Allied Joint Force (AJF)."⁴¹ A Group HQ, a HQ company or a number of CIMIC support companies may constitute the elements of the CIMIC Group in the field. The size and a composition of the CIMIC Group will depend on the requirements of the particular mission and capabilities of the countries which contribute their forces. By conducting CIMIC activities (i.e. preparation of constant

⁴⁰ Quoted in Rehse, 36.

⁴¹ AJP-9, 5-1.

assessments or establishment of CIMIC centers), a CIMIC Group supports the Commander in fulfilling his mission. Moreover, there are various functional specialists (not only military but also civilian) included in the structure of a CIMIC Group. Again, their number, tasks and areas of expertise will depend upon the needs of the mission and their availability. Thus, having a wide range of specialists at its disposal, CIMIC Groups can provide reliable assessments in the following areas:⁴²

- Civil Administration,
- Civil Infrastructure,
- Humanitarian Aid,
- Economy and Commerce, and
- Cultural Affairs.

Civilian experts within CIMIC structures tend to be more open to considering the needs of local authorities and populations and usually approach culturally sensitive situations from a different perspective than military personnel. Thus, they can provide a link between the two “worlds” and improve communication and cooperation with the civilian organizations working in the JOA.

2. CIMIC Centres - CMOCs

CIMIC Centres constitute places where civilian organizations, local authorities, local representatives and the military can meet and discuss the situation in the JOA. Such meetings are a great opportunity for different actors to exchange information, establish common goals and areas of responsibilities, and build mutual understanding and trust. The best locality for organizing CIMIC Centres is usually outside military zones, depending on security matters and availability. When the military arrives after the lead IOs and NGOs, it is important for the military to respect the existing lines of cooperation, coordination and communication which have already been created in the field, and to try to organize CIMIC Centres close to where the HQs of the lead civilian agencies are located. The following are the key functions of CIMIC Centres:⁴³

⁴² AJP-9, 5-1.

⁴³ Ibid., 5-3.

- Provide initial points of contact,
- Provide a focal point for liaison,
- Facilitate information exchange,
- Provide advice on the availability and mechanics of military assistance to civilian organizations, and
- Reinforce the legitimacy of the Force in the eyes of civil authorities and the local population.

I. CIMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH HUMANITARIAN ACTORS

Having covered the main CIMIC definitions, tasks and applications, the basics of the main civilian actors in peace operations should also be appropriately developed. Civilian players can be responsible for a very wide range of activities such as humanitarian aid, human rights, minorities protection, refugees and internally displaced persons, legal assistance, medical care, reconstruction, agriculture, education, arts, sciences and general project funding.⁴⁴ So, as the AJP-9 suggests, to achieve fruitful cooperation, it is crucial for CIMIC personnel to fully understand the mandate, role, structure, methods and principles that guide these organizations. More than just the military point of view be presented in this part. Using approaches from military doctrines and also from humanitarian publications should serve as a step toward better understanding of how CIMIC is seen by the civilian community working in the field, and what the demands of the civilian environment toward the military to improve the existing relationships are.

J. TYPES OF CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS

The NATO CIMIC doctrine underlines the importance and the multiplicity of civilian actors present in the JOA. To clarify the relationships with the civilian environment and to increase the level of mutual understanding, the AJP-9 distinguishes four key types of civilian organizations.⁴⁵

1. International Organizations (IOs)

IOs are established by intergovernmental agreements and operate at the international level. Their tasks are basically connected with humanitarian relief and they

⁴⁴ AJP-9, 8-1.

⁴⁵ See AJP-9, Chapter 8.

act under the “umbrella” of the UN. The main contemporary IOs include: UN High Commissioner’s Office for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the World Food Program (WFP), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).⁴⁶ The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) constitutes the exception among these organizations. Unlike those mentioned above, the ICRC was not created by intergovernmental agreements but performs its activities according to the Geneva Conventions.⁴⁷ The main task of the ICRC is the protection of the lives and dignity of war victims; the core principles guiding this organization are: humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence.

2. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization defines NGOs as voluntary and usually not government-funded organizations. They act as non-profit organizations and remain completely independent of governments, UN agencies or other IOs. The number of NGOs has increased over time. Because of their political neutrality, they have proven to be very effective; their actions can bring great benefit where political battles have failed. There are two categories of NGOs:

- **Mandated:** These NGOs are officially recognized by the lead international organization in a crisis and are authorized to operate in the area.
- **Non-Mandated:** These NGOs do not enjoy official recognition or authorization. Thus, they primarily work as private concerns. Non-mandated NGOs can be contracted or sub-contracted by an IO or a mandated NGO; otherwise, their funds come from private enterprises and individuals.

3. International and National Donor Agencies

These agencies are responsible for the funding, monitoring and evaluation of development programs. The lead IOs should ideally be responsible for the coordination of the actions of these organizations.

Also worthy of mention are organizations mainly specialized in reconstruction work (e.g. the UN Development Program – UNDP). Representatives of these

⁴⁶ AJP-9, 8-1.

⁴⁷ Rehse, 34.

organizations usually have spent a longer time in the JOA than the military, thus having greater expertise concerning the needs of the local infrastructure. So, the role of CIMIC personnel will be to coordinate the exchange of experience and knowledge between these experts and local authorities in order to create the most encouraging conditions for the reconstruction projects in the JOA.

K. LEAD AGENCIES

The lead agency has been mandated by the international community to “initiate the coordination of the activities of civilian organizations, which volunteer to participate in an operation.”⁴⁸ It is usually a key UN agency such as UNHCR, UNICEF or OCHA. Because the main task of the lead agency is to gather information about civilian organizations acting in the area and to coordinate the activities of these organizations, it is of great importance for CIMIC staff to encourage the members of the lead agency to facilitate and maintain effective cooperation with the military. Thus, as the NATO CIMIC doctrine suggests, the relationship between the lead agency and the military is of great significance. According to the AJP-9, specific tasks of a lead agency are:

- to serve as a point of contact for other agencies (planning and information sharing);
- to coordinate activities in order to avoid duplication of effort or wasting resources; and
- to link the civilian organizations with the military.⁴⁹

L. CORE PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

As was mentioned earlier in the case of the ICRC, humanitarian assistance must be provided according to the three main principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. For better understanding of the civilian organizations acting in the JOA, it will be very useful to present these key definitions.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ AJP-9, 8-3.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 8-4.

⁵⁰ Definitions taken from *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*, March 2003, available at: <http://ochaonline.un.org/mcdu/guidelines> (last visited on 20 November 2006).

Humanity: Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.

Neutrality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.

Impartiality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.

Indeed, the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality guide the actions of the humanitarian community across the world. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs issued a document which explains all the key issues related to humanitarian relief and to what degree and in which way the civilian organizations should cooperate with the military in complex emergencies.

Peter Rehse in *CIMIC: Concepts, Definitions and Practice* noticed that there is much confusion in the contemporary peacekeeping reality concerning CIMIC terminology. As he explains, the increasing number of civil-military interactions has resulted in the multiplying of CIMIC concepts throughout various actors coexisting in the field. The use of the CIMIC concept among numerous organizations, and the lack of consistency in perception, led to confusion and misunderstanding. Rehse argues that such a situation is understandable because, considering the multiple natures and cultures involved, it is impossible to define CIMIC activities under one encompassing term.⁵¹ The author says that in the last years of international intervention, the need to include CIMIC in peacekeeping missions has increased enormously. Such situations demanded from NATO the creation of a complete new CIMIC doctrine, procedures and terminology. Constant reliance of the NATO on these new concepts pressured the other

⁵¹ Rehse, 15.

civilian organizations to develop their own CIMIC terminology in order to separate and differentiate their actions from those of NATO.⁵² This is, for instance, how UNOCHA defines CIMIC activities:

Civil-Military Coordination: The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.⁵³

This definition clearly shows the objectives of Civil-Military Coordination in peacekeeping from the civilian community perspective. For the military, CIMIC units are responsible for the smooth cooperation and coordination of civilian and military efforts which will positively influence the mission's outcomes. For the civilian agencies, on the other hand, Civil-Military Coordination is exclusively related to humanitarian emergencies and is entirely focused on delivering humanitarian aid without endangering basic humanitarian principles described above. Moreover, according to the definition, Civil-Military Coordination from the civilian agencies' perspective may range from peaceful co-existence to fruitful cooperation.

M. CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION IN PRACTICE – THE HUMANITARIAN APPROACH

Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies repeatedly underlines the importance of fruitful cooperation with the military in peace operations; but, at the same time, points out that the military must be familiar with the core humanitarian principles.⁵⁴ As the authors of the document suggest, civil-military coordination should be “a shared responsibility of the humanitarian and military actors, and it may take place in various levels of intensity and form.”⁵⁵ Moreover, it is also important to differentiate two kinds of relationships between the military and civilian organizations. First, when there are no

⁵² Rehse, 15-16.

⁵³ *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies*, An Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group (IASC-WG) Reference Paper, 28 June 2004, available at: <http://ochaonline.un.org/mcdg/guidelines> (last visited on 15 November 2006), 5.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 6.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

common goals defined, the relationship should be described as a peaceful co-existence, where the two actors try to minimize competition and conflict, in order to allow the other to do their job without disruption. Second, in the case where there are common goals and strategies established between the military and humanitarian community, “cooperation may become possible, and coordination should focus on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the combined efforts to serve humanitarian objectives.”⁵⁶

Some practical guidelines considering civil-military coordination will be presented in this section. All issues will be discussed according to *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies* and will concern the approach taken by humanitarian workers.

1. Liaison Arrangements

The authors of *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies* consider the significance of ensuring proper lines of communication between civilians and the military at every possible level and at the earliest possible stage of the operation. Such arrangements help in the effective exchange of information, before and during military engagement in the mission. The paper suggests, at the same time, that proper preparation for UN humanitarian personnel is also of great importance, and gives the examples of courses conducted for civilians to meet the required level of preparation for the mission.

2. Exchange of Information

The *Civil Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies* clearly states in the beginning of this paragraph that only that information which cannot endanger human lives or the perception of impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian organizations can be shared. However, as it is further explained, some information exchange will be necessary in order to fulfill humanitarian tasks and bring relief to those in need. These are the areas of information which may be shared: security, humanitarian locations, humanitarian activities, mines, population movements, relief activities of the military and post-strike information.

⁵⁶ *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies*.

3. Use of Military Assets for Humanitarian Operations

As the *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies* argues, “the use of military assets in support of humanitarian operations should be exceptional and only as a last resort.”⁵⁷ Presented are the four conditions under which military assets can be used by humanitarian actors:⁵⁸

- Unique capability – alternative civilian resources do not exist;
- Timeliness – there is a demand for an immediate action;
- Clear humanitarian distinction – civilian control over the use of military assets. In this case, it is important to understand that while the military assets will be still controlled by the military, the humanitarian agency will be responsible for the whole operation; and
- Time-limited – the use is clearly limited in time and scale.

4. Should the Military Conduct Relief Operations?

From the point of view of the humanitarian community, armed forces should be strongly discouraged from conducting humanitarian actions. Military relief operations, even when their purpose is purely humanitarian, can seriously damage the overall humanitarian action taken by civilian agencies in the JOA. It is suggested that the military focus primarily on security matters, which will essentially enable humanitarian assistance and contribute to the enduring and stable peace in the region. However, under some exceptional circumstances, temporary humanitarian relief can be provided by the military.

Raj Rana in *Contemporary Challenges in the Civil-Military Relationship: Complementarity or Incompatibility?*⁵⁹ describes the current state of relations between civilian organizations – mainly those of ICRC – and the military. All the core principles

⁵⁷ *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies*, 13. *Last resort* is defined as follows: Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in capability and availability (See paragraph 7 of the *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*).

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁵⁹ Raj Rana, *Contemporary Challenges in the Civil-Military Relationship: Complementary or Incompatibility?* Available at: <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/darfur/uploads/military/Challenges%20in%20Humanitarian%20Military%20Relationship%20by%20Raj%20RANA.pdf> (last visited on 13 November 2006). The author works with the Unit for Relations with Armed and Security Forces at the International Committee of the Red Cross.

and assumptions regarding civil-military relations in humanitarian operations (from the point of view of the ICRC) can be found in the quoted statement provided at the beginning of the paper.⁶⁰ The author of the statement underlines the importance of maintaining clear distinctions between humanitarian and military operations. Moreover, the ICRC agrees that the military may provide humanitarian relief as a last resort; but, at the same time, their wish is to avoid blurring lines between humanitarian actions and the core goals assigned for the military mission.

Using examples from the contemporary conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, Raj explains that the nature of current military operations has humanitarian actions integrated with the broader domain of military actions. The military frequently started using humanitarian relief operations to support their mission by winning “hearts and minds” of the local authorities and populations. Additionally, these actions also served as a “force multiplication” and “force protection.”⁶¹

Raj also notices that the contemporary range of military activities has become surprisingly wide – “the military is able to jump from waging war to peacekeeping to humanitarian assistance on the same day, at times within the same city.”⁶² She also predicts that the future role of embedded civilian experts into military structures will systematically increase. To face these new phenomena, Raj argues, the humanitarian community must accept the current roles of the military, and put greater emphasis on civil-military relations. This is where she sees the growing role of CIMIC and Civil

⁶⁰ The official ICRC statement which was given on 31 March 2004 in Geneva, quoted in Raj, 1-2.

⁶¹ Martin Woolacott, “Humanitarians must avoid becoming tools of power,” *The Guardian*, 2 April 2004, quoted in Raj, 3.

⁶² Raj, 4.

Affairs (CIMIC/CA).⁶³ Raj presents its role from the humanitarian community perspective this way:⁶⁴

- As the link which provides unity of effort between the military and the civilian actors operating in the field (local authorities, population, NGOs, IOs);
- As the military tool which monitors and influences the humanitarian conditions in the JOA;
- CIMIC/CA personnel play the role of “humanitarian diplomats and conscience of their Commander;”⁶⁵
- As one of the non-combat tools employed by the Commander to win the mission’s objectives; and
- CIMIC/CA humanitarian projects are almost the same as those conducted by humanitarian agencies.

This is how the ICRC understands its priorities concerning possible cooperation and/or relations with the military:⁶⁶

- Human dignity and saving lives are essential and leading terms for the ICRC. Political and military considerations cannot constitute the principal directives.
- From the ICRC’s point of view, the primary goal for the military should be to provide security and order in the JOA.
- Although the ICRC understands the need for consultation and cooperation with the military at every possible level of operations, it also underlines the importance of maintaining its independence for decisions and tasks.

While Raj seems to be concerned that the blurring of roles and players in the field can create the wrong perception of “taking sides” by civilian workers, thus endangering

⁶³ Raj differentiates these two terms for NATO and the U.S. approaches. For the purpose of this thesis, there will be activities and real-life examples presented from the areas of both CIMIC (NATO) and Civil Affairs (U.S.). Although functions of these two organizations are not completely the same (for the Civil Affairs definition see: Joint Chiefs of Staff Library, 20 June 2004, available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/> (last visited on 28 November 2006), this thesis will focus on similarities rather than differences between them. Because the main task of CIMIC and CA units is to act outside of the military fences and to deal with various IOs, NGOs and the civilian population in the JOA in order to support the mission’s objectives, the main point will be to present what kinds of challenges CIMIC/CA personnel may meet in a peacekeeping environment.

⁶⁴ Raj, 9-10.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 25. These can be found in “ICRC Guidelines for civil-military relations” included in Raj’s paper as an appendix.

their lives and jeopardizing the goals of humanitarian actions, she sees a better future of contemporary complex interventions in improving the cooperation between the military and civilian actors.

Contemporary Peace Support Operations (PSOs) showed that only by effective cooperation between civilian and military actors working in the JOA can the desired end-state be achieved. Unfortunately, because of several significant barriers dividing the two different “cultural worlds,” there is still much to be done to make such cooperation fully effective and enduring.

Although both the military and the humanitarian communities seem to understand that building mutual understanding, cooperation and effective coordination between the two different types of organizations could be the only way to achieve the goals of the mission, the humanitarian community appears to be more reluctant to get into closer partnerships with the military acting in the JOA. Presumably, this is the result of concerns related to the risk of losing credibility and trust in the eyes of local authorities and populations. Humanitarian agencies are primarily focused on the three core principles, humanity, neutrality and impartiality, which must guide their actions and guarantee the safe conduct of their mission. As it is proposed in the *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies*, “the risk of compromising humanitarian operations by cooperating with the military might be reduced if all parties to the conflict recognize, agree or acknowledge in advance that humanitarian activities might necessitate civil-military coordination in certain exceptional circumstances.”⁶⁷ Technically well-prepared, experienced and competent CIMIC personnel can serve as an interface between all actors in the JOA as a way of improving mutual understanding and negotiating this acceptance with the local governments and/or communities.

The authors of *Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations*, suggest several relevant areas of action which should significantly improve civil-military relationships:⁶⁸

⁶⁷ *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies*, 10.

⁶⁸ Daniel Byman, Ian Lesser, Bruce Pirnie, Cheryl Benard, and Matthew Waxman, *Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000, 141.

- The military should be educated about the main humanitarian agencies. This, in the long term, should increase the mutual understanding while decreasing current tensions.
- Exchange of information between the military and the humanitarian community should be improved.
- All actions should be better planned (long-term planning) and coordinated by both military and civilian agencies.

There are probably many helpful “remedies” which could facilitate effective civil-military cooperation in peacekeeping. The author of *Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century* presented, for example, a much wider spectrum of actions and a more detailed set of guidelines which should be addressed to make civil-military relations smoother. Besides those listed above, it is suggested to the military and civilian organizations to start building fruitful cooperation on common values and concerns which must be clearly determined. The awareness of common goals should effectively improve mutual understanding and strengthen the effectiveness of both communities. Apart from that, as the authors explain, there is the need for improving cooperation on all levels, not only between military and civilian organizations, but also between various civilians working in the JOA.⁶⁹

Nothing creates more misunderstanding, generates more emotion and results in more confusion in modern peacekeeping than the subject of civil-military relations; yet nothing, absolutely nothing, is more important to successful peacekeeping in the new millennium than the cooperation and coordination between the principal contributors to a peacekeeping mission, military and non-military.

David Lightburn
Buenos Aires Seminar, August 2001⁷⁰

It seems obvious that the role of CIMIC in future Peace Support Operations (PSOs) will be increasing. Because of the complexity of contemporary PSOs, humanitarian agencies are not the only ones responsible for humanitarian relief operations. So, in order to improve the coordination of both military and civilian

⁶⁹ The Challenges Project, 150.

⁷⁰ Quoted in *Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century – Concluding Report 1997-2002*, 145.

organizations' efforts, multiple players have to accept and understand the objectives of their counterparts, and special arrangements such as mutual training, dispatching liaison officers and continuous cooperation must be made. Moreover, education for both the military and civilian community will also play an important role. By understanding their counterparts in peacekeeping, military and civilian "worlds" can significantly improve mutual cooperation, effectively decrease the number of misunderstandings and notably improve field efficiency.

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III. CIMIC-MEDIA RELATIONSHIPS

A. MEDIA-MILITARY TENSIONS AND RELATIONS DURING ARMED CONFLICT

There is a natural tension between the media and the government, and in particular the military. This is good. There should be tension. It is a part of the checks and balances system of the country... The press is very important to the well-being of the nation.

General Bernard E. Trainor⁷¹

Indeed, when discussing military-media relations, it is very difficult to disagree with Trainor's opinion. The public's right to know clearly explains the nature of contemporary military-media's tense relations. The journalist wants to tell a story that will be interesting and credible, usually irrespective of the outcome; the military, on the other hand, is in pursuit of national goals following specific tasks assigned by political leaders. Moreover, the military always has to consider the aspect of operational secrecy; some information simply cannot be shared with the media because they could badly damage the effectiveness of military tasks conducted within the mission. To present a complete picture of differences between the military and media worlds, it will be very helpful to look at a table constructed according to Trainor's explanations:⁷²

SOLDIER	JOURNALIST
Team player	Independent
Respects authority	Suspects authority
Disciplined	Undisciplined
Conservative	Liberal
Restrained	Unbridled
Mute	Articulate
Practical	Elitist

Table 1. Trainor's definitions of military and media actors in the field

⁷¹ General Bernard E. Trainor, *Military Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and Military-Media Relations*, University of California, Berkeley, 1995, 27.

⁷² Ibid., 29.

So, while the goals of the two institutions are different, and the culture so distinctively makes the two actors different, to achieve fruitful cooperation or even peaceful co-existence between the military and the media in the present military interventions can be very difficult. Nevertheless, because of the great power of the media related to unlimited capabilities of showing stories and shaping opinions, not only internationally but also locally, it is crucial for the military to build a successful and permanent relationship with journalists acting in the JOA. Moreover, the force must realize that in the globalized character of contemporary military interventions, the media will accompany military peace operations everywhere, irrespective of the decisions of military commanders. So, it will be the role of the military to find a way to create good cooperation with the media and to provide them with reliable information which will show the military peacekeeping effort in a positive light.⁷³

The media is a critical track in a holistic peacebuilding system because it can assist in reconstructing a common history, preventing enemy imaging, focusing public attention on violations of individual, political and human rights, and by getting protagonists to the table. The present electronic age is shaping civilization in an image of “Tribal Village.”⁷⁴

Elizabeth C. Hanson in “The Media, Foreign Policymaking, and Political Conflict” explains the role of the media in contemporary international relations. She asserts that in today’s reality the media is capable of being very influential, even capable of pushing governments to action. To support the argument, Hanson brings up the story of Somalia, when the permanent TV coverage of humanitarian crises captured the attention of public institutions and, thus, compelled the “government into a policy of intervention for humanitarian reasons.”⁷⁵

⁷³ Marjan Malesic, *Peace Support Operations, Mass Media, and the Public in Former Yugoslavia*, Stockholm 2000, available at: <http://www.krisberedskapsmyndigheten.se/444.epibrw> (last visited on 04 December 2006), 9-11.

⁷⁴ Tom Woodhouse, Oliver Ramsbotham (ed.), *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, Frank Cass, London 2000, 107.

⁷⁵ Elizabeth C. Hanson, “The Media, Foreign Policymaking, and Political Conflict,” *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 42, No. 1. (May 1998), 157.

Hanson deals with media-military and media-policy makers' relations in peace operations because, as she suggests, they are very challenging for policy makers for several crucial reasons:

- There is an essential difference between conventional war and a peace operation. Defining expected end-states, enemies or outcomes may become very difficult.
- Because there are no clearly defined adversaries, it is difficult to justify involvement with national security arguments; also, is it hard to obtain public support and give good reasons for casualties.
- Finally, PSOs usually draw more media attention than conventional wars.

Moreover, it is easier for the media to act in the JOA and get the information, because they cannot be restricted by the regulations connected with national security matters. Additionally, given the multi-organizational character of peace operations, where enormous actors such as IOs and NGOs are involved, it is more likely that the media presence will be noticeable.⁷⁶

In this way, policy makers' efforts to communicate and gain the support for their peacekeeping policies seem to be very difficult. A good way to send a desired message to the people and to build credibility and support for their policies would be, for the policy makers, to seek good relationships with the media.

Editor's demands for quick and constant information from the field constitute another very important factor which makes contemporary military interventions more difficult. To provide reliable and accurate information, journalists acting in the JOA need to have more time. Unfortunately, the pressure to be faster than others and the need to fulfill the task usually takes precedence over accuracy, thus complicating the whole peace process. Moreover, peacekeeping forces also have to deal with a "deliberate misrepresentation of the UN activities" which became a new instrument of war in Rwanda and the countries of former Yugoslavia.⁷⁷ Thus, as Goulding suggests, the peacekeeping force has to have its own capacity from the early days of arrival to the JOA, to communicate with the local and international media in order to provide the news,

⁷⁶ Hanson, 159.

⁷⁷ Marrack Goulding in Ingrid A. Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information*, Frank Cass, London 1999, xi-xii.

combat disinformation and persuade the audience about the clear-cut goals and efforts of the UN peacekeeping forces. This is the role of CIMIC personnel with the cooperation and advice of Public Affairs Offices (PAOs) working with every peacekeeping force to contribute to improving the relations with media, thus reaching the local and international audience.

Due to the media's ability to shape public opinion locally and internationally, active support for the military's missions by the media should always be sought. Instant images flowing from the JOA influence public perception of UN activities and thus have a decisive role in the public's understanding of the effectiveness of peacekeeping efforts. Thus, media's role in peace operations can no longer be ignored. Moreover, negative reporting from the JOA no doubt affects the entire picture of PSO in the eyes of the international audience and policy makers and in this way has an impact on the whole peace process.⁷⁸ So, UN peacekeeping forces, especially through PAOs and CIMIC, must cooperate closely with both the local and international media to show their actions in a positive light, resulting in the understanding and support of their activities by the public. Additionally, to avoid misinterpretation and negative framing of UN activities, the media should feel relatively free and the information should be provided following a clear protocol.⁷⁹

B. MEDIA – PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Since the previous section underlined the importance of the media in contemporary peacekeeping missions and pointed out how crucial media are when we consider their huge capabilities in influencing public opinion, the next paragraphs will deal with more specific spheres of military-media relations in PSOs. Because most officers are not accustomed to talking to the media and giving interviews in front of cameras, microphones or even when providing statements to newspapers,⁸⁰ some practical guidelines and suggestions concerning dealing with the media in the field will

⁷⁸ Goulding in Ingrid A. Lehmann, 2-3.

⁷⁹ Jennifer Kay Woofert, *Media Restrictions in United Nations Peacekeeping*, Master of Arts Thesis, 9 August 2000, Blacksburg, Virginia, available at: <http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-11272000-114350/unrestricted/jw-modified.pdf> (last visited on 4 December 2006), 103-104.

⁸⁰ "Media and the Military," Joint Services Warrant Officers' Course document, available at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uk/jswoc_chap7.doc (last visited on 4 December 2006).

be presented. These basic clues should enrich the military's knowledge of media, helping to understand media's goals and protocols. Only by promoting mutual understanding will the military be able to employ the power of information to our shared advantage. Moreover, the fundamental interviewing principles will hopefully assist soldiers when confronting media during military operations. The military should always be well prepared to tell its story; positively shaping the image of UN peacekeepers' activities will remain of great importance in the future.

My own Press conferences convinced me that television had added an extra dimension to the conduct of modern warfare: commanders in the future will have to be trained to handle it, but also to allow enough time and resources for it to be used to the fullest advantage. For someone like myself, who had deliberately kept a low profile... it was a strange and unnerving experience to stand in front of the cameras. Yet television is something that the modern commander cannot ignore.

General Sir Peter De La Billiere – Storm Command⁸¹

Because the number of media that accompany the military in international interventions has significantly increased over the last several years, soldiers participating in peacekeeping missions must always be prepared for meeting the media. About 700 journalists were embedded with U.S. forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. There were also more than 2,000 independent journalists who covered combat operations on their own.⁸² Media were present almost everywhere, soldiers had to share the information, often without particular preparation for the interview. Even if the results of the information that the military provides are not always predictable and not necessarily fruitful for the military, it is the role of the force to keep the press well informed. “Bad news does not improve with age and the mere appearance of with-holding or manipulation can destroy our credibility” – this is how U.S. Air Force Public Affairs Center of Excellence underlines the importance of providing true and timely news.⁸³

⁸¹ Quoted in “Media and the Military.”

⁸² *Meeting the Media*, U.S. Air Force Public Affairs Center of Excellence, 15 October 2003, available at: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pace/meetingmedia.pdf> (last visited on 2 December 2006), 3.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 4.

C. EMBEDDED MEDIA

The history of military-media relations can be split between times of fruitful cooperation and hatred. While media personnel always look for the good source of information which will draw public opinion's attention, the military tries to limit the outflow of information for security reasons. The Vietnam and Gulf Wars represent two very interesting examples worth noting. Though the policy makers' approach toward the media significantly differed in those cases, in final summary, the military-media relations noticeably deteriorated.⁸⁴ So, having in mind lessons learned from previous conflicts, the policy makers had to understand that only developing a new strategy on dealing with the media would improve cooperation in the field. The new approach had to be balanced between unlimited access to the battlefield and the huge limitations for the media during the Gulf War. As a result of these new thoughts, "in October 2002, Clarke and Whitman developed a plan to assign or "embed" reporters with the troops."⁸⁵ Some preliminary trials with embedding press staff with the troops were conducted during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and proved to be successful. The new conflict in Iraq in 2003 let the media and military fully develop the embedding strategy which resulted in accuracy and efficiency of providing the news from the battlefield. This policy was built on shared understanding and mutual respect between the military and journalists; both sides were encouraged to take part in joint training and field exercises before the deployment.⁸⁶ Some additional comments related to joint training and building trust and understanding between the media and military will be developed in the section devoted to training.

But how does the issue of embedded journalists relate to the question of post-conflict activities, and how important is the role of effective embedding during Peace Support Operations? As Rodriguez explains, while embedded press coverage worked

⁸⁴ For detailed information about the military-media relations in Vietnam see Daniel C. Hallin *The Uncensored War*, University of California Press, 1989; General Bernard E. Trainor, *Military Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and Military-Media Relations*, University of California, Berkeley, 1995; for Gulf War see Susan L. Carruthers *The Media at War*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000; David Benjamin *Censorship in the Gulf*, Auburn University, Alabama, 1995.

⁸⁵ Jose L. Rodriguez, *Embedding Success into the Military-Media Relationship*, Available at: <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/rodriguez.pdf> (last visited on 4 December 2006).

⁸⁶ Ibid.

perfectly during the military operation, later on, when the war was over and embedded journalists left their units, reporting from the field significantly decreased, which caused a drop in public support – both local and international – for stabilization forces. Bloody incidents started to dominate popular news, spoiling the positive images from the early stages of conflict. “With the loss of the embedded journalists, and no American-led/Iraqi-run television news outlet to cover the positive developments in Iraq, the information advantage enjoyed during combat operations eroded.”⁸⁷ In addition, as Rodriguez explains, because the U.S. forces did not organize a local TV station with Arabic speaking reporters, there was no possibility of showing the public the positive images of post-conflict activities conducted by the stabilization force.

Rodriguez also presents the shortcomings connected with media operations during military operations in Iraq. These were underlined during the U.S. Army War College Embedded Media Conference in September 2003.⁸⁸ One of the main conclusions was related to the fact that the media left their troops too early, impairing the functioning of the whole information campaign machinery, and significantly diminishing public support for the stabilization part of the operation. Also underlined was that “reporters should be embedded with Civil Affairs (CA) units specifically to cover activities involving civilians”⁸⁹ and all the positive images related with CA activities which could support stabilization efforts of the military force.

D. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

Not only well prepared personnel working for the PAO will be responsible for all the preparations and contacts in which the media will be involved. One of the most important roles of the PAO will be to prepare all military personnel to deal with the media. Because CIMIC personnel act as independent units, very often outside military compounds, meeting with local authorities, individual contractors or various International and Non-Governmental Organizations assisting in bringing humanitarian relief or doing

⁸⁷ Rodriguez.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

small reconstruction projects in the JOA, it will be more likely that CIMIC officers will face the media. Here is some practical advice concerning the areas in which soldiers can rely on PAOs:⁹⁰

- PAO personnel can advise if the planned interview is authorized or proper;
- Given the area of the interview, PAO staff can predict questions likely to be asked;
- PAO personnel can prepare the place and the ground rules of the proposed interview;
- Monitoring and even taping the interview can be also provided by PAO staff; and
- Besides the role of liaison with the news representatives, PAO officers may provide post-interview feedback.

E. BEING INTERVIEWED

As it is suggested in *Meeting the Media*, while the military is usually rather reluctant to talk to the media, properly transmitted information can correct the record, fight critics or answer accusations, and, of course, tell the positive news considering, for instance, the great performance of the peacekeeping force. The interviewed person, basically, has no control over what questions will be asked, but can always control what will be said during an interview. The cardinal rule of the interview is that there is “no such thing as an “off-the-record” interview”⁹¹ – everything that is said when you talk to the media can be reported; the camera and/or a tape recorder may always be “on.” Area of responsibility and competence is also very important for the person who will be interviewed. It is proper to rethink the idea of a planned interview and determine if the domain of the topic might require involvement of the superior. The interviewed person should never talk about matters which do not belong to his/her jurisdiction.

⁹⁰ *Meeting the Media*, 5.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

It is important to be kind when talking to the media. Hostility and distancing toward media will surely result in a very similar approach. Interviewed military personnel who are polite and understand journalists' goals and protocol, will create credibility and fruitful cooperation. There are some guidelines which should be considered by the interviewed person:⁹²

- Your statements should be short, simple and specific. At the same time, do not answer with “yes” or “no” which may cause the impression that you are rude and uncooperative. Take breaks after every answer; journalist should lead the interview and ask further questions;
- Do not discuss issues that are not of your domain. Try to avoid speculations;
- Because you do not have to tell everything that you know (for instance for security reasons) – admit it overtly;
- Do not hurry with your answers. Do not use “no comment” which usually causes mistrust and a feeling that you do not want to cooperate;
- Try to bind your answers to real-life examples, which will help your audience in understanding what you are talking about;
- When facing a multi-layer question, try to relate only to that part which allows you to make a positive statement, leave the remaining or troublesome issues of the question. If the journalist is unsatisfied with your answer, he/she will restate the question;
- Using and repeating so called “color words” (“deaths”, “massacre”, “scandal”) is not suggested. By producing negative association, these words may become counterproductive to the objectives of the interview;
- Do not be a mirror of your interviewer's mood; when he/she behaves rudely – be polite and stay calm. The people's attention will always be focused on the interviewed person, not on the journalist;
- Avoid using military acronyms which can cause confusion or misunderstandings; speaking with jargon or military technical language is also discouraged. It is necessary to use an approachable language;
- Never lie or implicitly show that you are hiding something. Make your statements reliable, complete and competent. Always remember that you are talking not only for yourself and the picture you create reaches beyond the military compounds; and
- Do not restate unreliable data or terms presented by the reporter. If you know the real facts, gently clarify; if you know that these facts are not

⁹² *Meeting the Media*, 8-9. Although all the suggestions were specified for the Air Force personnel, they have a universal application and may be used in every situation by any kind of military personnel.

proven – admit it. Public opinion must see that you clarified the questionable facts, or explained that some data are not accurate. By not reacting to unverified data, the audience may later associate them with your person.

Talking with the media is very important for the success of contemporary peacekeeping. It is necessary to create good relations with the media and provide them with reliable news which will positively influence the vision of the whole peacekeeping effort in the eyes of both locals and the international audience. Ross Howard in *An Operational Framework for Media and Peacebuilding*⁹³ presents the media as a double-edged sword. While, by framing the news, the media can contribute to the creation of a bad picture of the peacebuilding effort, which can result in a decrease in international support for the mission; it can, at the same time, affect the peace process very positively. There is a bright side to the media, in Howard's view. He argues that it can be "an instrument of conflict resolution,... it can uphold accountability and expose malfeasance,... enable a society to make well-informed choices, which is the precursor of democratic governance, and reduce conflict and foster security."⁹⁴ Thus, given all these advantages, we cannot ignore the power of the media and must be prepared to meet and cooperate with them in the field.

F. CIMIC AND THE MEDIA IN PEACEKEEPING

As was explained earlier, meeting with media in the contemporary international military interventions will not only be a matter for well prepared PAO personnel. Because of the multilateral approach and diplomatic effort of Peace Support Operations, the multinational character of the force engaged in the mission, the involvement of numerous governmental and non-governmental organizations, and the unavoidable presence of the media, the possibility of meeting the media in the field is very likely. CIMIC personnel, who usually conduct their activities outside of the military zones meeting with numerous civilian actors acting in the JOA, will be especially likely to contact the media. Because the essential task of CIMIC in peacekeeping is creating and managing the communication between peacekeepers and the host country, there will be

⁹³ Ross Howard, *An Operational Framework for Media and Peacebuilding*, IMPACS – Institute for Media and Civil Society, Canada 2002, available at: <http://commonsense.epfl.ch/Resources/Media/impacs.pdf> (last visited on 2 December 2006).

⁹⁴ Ibid.

various meetings with the local authorities or tribal leaders organized at CMOCs or other places situated outside the military compounds. Such gatherings are great opportunities for the media to get the news; at the same time, these meetings and the news reported by the media can also help in communication between the peacekeeping force and the local community. So, the role of CIMIC officers will also be to create a positive image of the peacekeeping effort by providing reliable news to the media – which media will always desire.

Indeed, “the interaction between peacekeepers, on the one hand, and the host country, on the other” constitutes the “vital aspect of the communications process in peacekeeping missions.”⁹⁵ Thus, CIMIC staff by organizing CMOCs or CIMIC houses try to reach the local population. What is especially vital for the view of the peacekeeping force in the eyes of the local communities is CIMIC personnel cooperating with IOs, NGOs and local contractors, conducting various quick impact infrastructure reconstruction projects, thus making the lives of locals easier. Inger Skjelsbaek in “The NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Military Intervention Facing New Civilian Challenges” discusses civil-military relations during the mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, pointing out the importance of CIMIC. Skjelsbaek explains CIMIC activities that had been conducted in the region. He gives the examples of the quick impact projects and other enterprises organized by CIMIC staff which include: building schools, “helping displaced people” and organizing CIMIC houses where the local people can come and discuss their problems.⁹⁶ Again, such news as the opening of a new school that has been built in the mutual effort of the local community and peacekeepers, or a spectacular and well organized assistance to the displaced persons, represent very good material for the media. It is the role of CIMIC personnel to understand the need of close cooperation with the media in order to tell the good story to the public, which in turn will positively impact the perception of the whole peacekeeping effort in the region.

⁹⁵ Lehmann, 17.

⁹⁶ Inger Skjelsbaek, “The NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Military Intervention Facing New Civilian Challenges,” available at: http://www.prio.no/files/file45003_chapter_3.pdf (last visited on 2 December 2006).

Constructive outcomes of the combined efforts of the locals, military and the media will create trust and a feeling of success, thus generating great encouragement for future cooperation.

G. TOWARD BETTER MILITARY-MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS

For Jennifer Kay Woofter, the best way to improve military-media relations and to create better understanding among these two camps working in a peacekeeping domain is to organize a permanent training structure, which will engage the military and the media in joint preparation exercises.⁹⁷ Indeed, in order to make military-media communication better, some initiatives concerning mutual learning must be organized. Joint exercises will surely increase the level of mutual respect and understanding, diminishing the negative influence on working relationships caused by different cultures.

It's really kind of naïve for the military to expect the press to behave themselves when the military doesn't really work with the press when it trains. It's naïve of the press to think that they can suddenly dispatch a bunch of reporters to a military operation who don't know which end of the tank the bullet comes out of.⁹⁸

Thus, it would be right to come back to the question of joint training, discussed by Rodriguez in "Embedding Success into the Military-Media Relationship." Rodriguez also supports the idea of improving military-media relations by mutual training. As an example, he examines the preparation training that was organized by the Pentagon for both the military and the press before deployment in Iraq in 2003. In order to familiarize journalists with the conditions present in the field, the military offered them special training. A significant number of journalists took part in such field exercises called "Embed Boot Camps" which were conducted at Ft. Benning, Ft. Dix, Quantico Marine Corps Base and Norfolk Naval Station in Virginia. The courses lasted a week and included such activities as nuclear, biological and chemical training.⁹⁹ The training was not mandatory, nevertheless many journalists participated. The main idea of such an

⁹⁷ Woofter, 121.

⁹⁸ Quoted in Woofter.

⁹⁹ Rodriguez, 5.

enterprise was to break barriers between the press and the military. One of the journalists described the event as, “alternately enlightening, entertaining, horrifying, and physically exhausting,”¹⁰⁰

Embedding arrangements developed by the U.S military seem to be revolutionary and very successful. Because, during such “Embed Boot Camps,” not only reporters but also soldiers have the opportunity to get closer to their field “partners,” this experience is mutually rewarding.

[“Embed Boot Camps”] allowed the reporters and military to build trust in each other and to get familiar with each other’s terminology and routines. It also allowed the news organizations and reporters the opportunity to test their new equipment, techniques, and procedures for reporting in what would be a fluid, hectic environment.¹⁰¹

While the media plays a crucial role in the contemporary peace operations, it would be a very good solution if such trainings become more popular, not only in the United States, but also in Europe, especially among those countries that actively participate in international peacekeeping efforts. CIMIC units may also serve here as links between the two different “worlds” and play the role of leaders while dealing with these ideas. Taking into consideration the role that CIMIC plays in the peacekeeping field, decision makers should realize that improving media-military communications will surely be mutually gratifying.

The role of the local population in the peacekeeping process is obviously very important. The goals of the mission cannot be achieved without prior understanding and significant support of the local communities for the whole peace effort. Thus, this is the challenging task for the international community, politicians and for the peacekeeping force to find good channels of communication with locals. As Marjan Malesic in *Peace Support Operations, Mass Media, and the Public in Former Yugoslavia* argues, “it is obvious that the way to the population is through the mass media”.¹⁰² Moreover, as

¹⁰⁰ Rodriguez.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 6.

¹⁰² Marjan Malesic, *Peace Support Operations, Mass Media, and the Public in Former Yugoslavia*, Stockholm 2000, available at: <http://www.krisberedskapsmyndigheten.se/444.epibrw> (last visited on 4 December 2006), 10.

Malesic explains, it is crucial for the military to realize some relevant facts about the media. First, while it operates strictly on the ground and the probability of media encounters is very high, the military should be accordingly prepare for such encounters. Second, the role of the military should also be to know the attitude of the media toward the peacekeeping force. Finally, the military must be aware of the great influence of the media on local and international audiences, requiring peacekeepers to treat the media with the utmost respect and seriousness. Keeping the local communities well informed about peacekeeping activities conducted in the region can be achieved by establishing a fruitful cooperation between peacekeeping force and the media; this should be organized on the basis of CIMIC-media communication.

IV. CIMIC AND CULTURAL ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY PEACEKEEPING

Cultural issues in peacekeeping missions are important for CIMIC personnel in the same way as the matters related to the media. This chapter will explain why an increased cultural awareness and specific pre-deployment training for CIMIC officers should be highly encouraged. CIMIC activities usually take place outside of military compounds, where many of the military's typical behaviors do not apply. CIMIC staff, as it was in the case of the media, are especially vulnerable to cultural issues in peace operations, because it is the role of CIMIC units to cooperate and coexist with various IOs, NGOs, local authorities, tribal leaders, contractors and individuals. All these organizations and actors represent different cultures, not only in an organizational sphere, but also considering religions, nations, tribes or customs. The importance of culture for CIMIC personnel will be underlined in this section. For better understanding of the need for increased cultural awareness among soldiers, and to show what kind of cultural issues CIMIC staff typically meets in the field, some authentic stories will be presented. By building a broader image of CIMIC activities in the field, the real-life examples will lead to the right conclusions concerning appropriate cultural preparation for the mission.

A. CULTURE

It will be very helpful to start with a short theoretical discussion concerning the term "culture." Such basic exploration of the meaning of "culture" will contribute to the better understanding of this section; also, it will assist in associating cultural issues with practical implementations of "culture" in the field. Kevin Avruch in *Culture and Conflict Resolution* broadly develops the meaning of "culture." First, he proposes a rather ambiguous definition: "that culture is a derivative of individual experience, something learned or created by individuals themselves or passed on to them socially by contemporaries or ancestors."¹⁰³ Then, Avruch explains, that the presented definition suggests that the term of "culture" is more changeable than previously expected and proposed by social sciences. What is important, as Avruch asserts, is that not only the

¹⁰³ Kevin Avruch, *Culture and Conflict Resolution*, Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 1998, 5.

influence of the ancestors, “tribes, ethnic group, and nation,” matters when we discuss the meaning of “culture.” When we try to develop a fully appropriate definition of “culture,” we have to consider the fact that it also derives from “profession, occupation, class, religion, or region.” This way, Avruch suggests, the presented definition explains that “individuals embody multiple cultures, and that culture is always psychologically and socially distributed in the group.”¹⁰⁴ As it was presented, “culture” is not easy to define. While it may constitute a set of inherited experiences and deeply rooted habits, “culture” can also be represented by the contemporary and altering sets of experiences transmitted within such groupings as professions or classes. What is also important, as a result of the complexity of cross-organizational and interpersonal globalized reality, is that individuals can embody multiple cultures.

B. PEACEKEEPING ENVIRONMENT – “CULTURAL PUZZLE”

Today’s peacekeeping missions provide intercultural challenges for peacekeepers. Because the U.N. forces come from different countries and are working in a non-familiar environment, culture shock and cultural misunderstandings are inevitable. Communication is a constant challenge in any intercultural endeavor...¹⁰⁵

The end of the Cold War brought enormous changes in the conduct of peace support operations (PSOs). Today, international interventions encompass a wide variety of actors, actively participating in bringing relief to those in need. Traditional peacekeeping has been transformed into very complicated and multi-task enterprise that includes humanitarian actions, electoral efforts, human rights issues, peacemaking and peacebuilding. The multicultural composition of military forces and diverse nature of IOs, NGOs and local communities, demands a well coordinated effort and better preparation of both civilian and military actors allowing a wider “repertoire of skills.”¹⁰⁶

Indeed, as Duffey argues, many problems of the contemporary peacekeeping relate to culture. Things like coordination problems between civilian and military organizations, communication difficulties or even problematic and unclear mandates, are

¹⁰⁴ Avruch.

¹⁰⁵ Paul R. Kimmel, “Cultural and Ethnic Issues of Conflict and Peacekeeping” in H. J. Langholtz, *The Psychology of Peacekeeping*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998, 62.

¹⁰⁶ Tamara Duffey “Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping” in Tom Woodhouse, Oliver Ramsbotham (ed.), *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, Frank Cass, London, 2000, 142.

all strictly connected with the cultural sphere of PSOs. This wider range of activities brought many unexpected problems which can surely be associated with culture. Those who plan and conduct peace operations, as well as all host country actors, constitute a piece of the bigger cultural framework. Additionally, Duffey explains, culture has a great impact on the peacekeeping environment, and, when the participants lack cultural awareness and understanding, it can severely impede achieving mission's objectives.¹⁰⁷ Because culture really matters in peacekeeping, there should be constant analysis performed by policy makers in order to decrease the harmful influence of culture, thus increasing the effectiveness of the whole peacekeeping effort.

To fully understand the role of culture in peacekeeping, Duffey argues, it is necessary to first recognize the main cultural communities which take part in the peacekeeping effort. As she explains, the most important cultural relationships exist internally, between the peacekeeping force which consists of many different nationalities, including various civilian organizations and civilian individuals incorporated in the mission structures; and externally, between the military and the numerous IOs, NGOs, local communities and individuals. Thus, it is underlined that given the organizational diversity among actors in the field, each of these organizations tries to “play the game” according to its own rules. The rules vary depending on understanding of the situation, practices, norms and policies which have been developed based on previous experience. Cultural gaps between all actors in the peacekeeping environment also exist, because each player created its own cultural way of thinking and doing things – a set of norms – which help to propagate its philosophy and achieve its objectives.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, as Duffey asserts, by careful analysis of the cultural environment that is characteristic of a particular mission, there should be a “culturally sensitive approach” developed, which, she argues, will be “more likely to support sustainable peace processes.”¹⁰⁹

To avoid problems and misconduct connected with the lack of cultural sensitivity in previous peacekeeping missions (see i.e. O'Neill and Rees, 2005), the international

¹⁰⁷ Duffey, 143.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 148.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 146.

community and all actors which actively participate in peace support operations must consider lessons learned and incorporate cultural aspects during preparation for current and future peace operations. “Solid, thorough preparation for dealing with an unfamiliar culture can often mean the difference between success and failure in peacekeeping missions.”¹¹⁰ It is significant to be aware of the cultural differences, and it is crucial to see the ways in which misunderstandings related to the lack of cultural preparation for the mission can seriously hamper peacekeeping efforts. Additionally, because all players in the field have various skills, expectations, capabilities and experiences,¹¹¹ we must develop a mission strategy which will identify shared goals, allowing them to achieve their objectives through mutual support and fruitful cooperation.

Except cultural differences and clashes between numerous organizations such as IOs, NGOs and individuals acting in the peacekeeping field, there are obviously internal conflicts between peacekeepers who usually come from many various nationalities. Charles C. Moskos Jr. in *Peace Soldiers* argues that military culture really matters. By analyzing the composition and behavior (the author provides authentic statistical data and soldier’s statements) of soldiers in United Nations Mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the author explains what kind of conflicts were apparent among nationalities, what role the country of origin played in soldier’s behaviors, and in which ways the internal cultural mélange influenced the effectiveness of the whole peace operation.¹¹²

Considering the year in which the book has been written, it must be concluded that the aspects of culture influencing peacekeeping did not develop with the end of the Cold War. Cultural matters existed since the time when various organizations and soldiers from different nationalities started to participate in multinational peace support

¹¹⁰ Victoria Edwards, “The Role of Communication in Peace and Relief Mission Negotiations,” available at: <http://accurapid.com/journal/20interpr.htm> (last visited on 16 December 2006).

¹¹¹ Larry Wentz, “Peace Support Operations: Cooperation, Coordination, and Information Sharing: Lessons from Kosovo” available at: http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf (last visited on 15 December 2006), 691.

¹¹² Charles Moskos, Jr. *Peace Soldiers*. The University of Chicago Press, 1976, 1.

operations. But, as Moskos points out, because many authors examined the organizational side of peace operations, his intention was to come down from the strategic level and analyze particular relationships between individuals involved in peacekeeping.

The main task for Moskos was to determine, using “military sociology” divagations, whether the “traditional notions of soldierly honor”¹¹³ can be adapted to the roles demanded by peace operations. Also, he wanted to find out how the international nature of peacekeeping forces influences soldier’s obedience and how difficult it is to transform soldiers with different backgrounds to the roles they have to play in PSOs. Moskos defines many kinds of internal conflicts which appeared among UNFICYP forces on various levels: conflict between UNFICYP and the UN, between UNFICYP and home military establishments, between UNFICYP HQs and national contingents, between national contingents within UNFICYP, between various components within the same nationalities and between military personnel and civilian staff of UNFICYP.¹¹⁴ His findings lead to the conclusion that it is really a great challenge to create a supportive environment for the multinational nature of peacekeeping forces to work effectively in the field.

Robert Getso in “Preparing Warriors to Be Peacekeepers” represents a very interesting approach to the issue of preparation of soldiers for peace support operations.¹¹⁵ He argues that because of the huge gap between the nature of wars and peacekeeping operations, the transformation of “warriors” into “peace soldiers” proves to be very challenging. While both “warriors” and peacekeepers share common military knowledge and similar backgrounds, their training for the mission and especially conduct of field tasks vary significantly. Thus, Getso underlines cultural differences between these two kinds of military professions, and suggests much better specialist pre-deployment training for soldiers taking part in PSOs.

¹¹³ Moskos, Jr.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 68-79.

¹¹⁵ Robert Getso, “Preparing Warriors to be Peacekeepers,” available at: http://www.class.uidaho.edu/martin_archives/peace_journal/Peacekeeping/Peacekeeping1.doc (last visited on 16 December 2006).

Employing the military in peacekeeping or non-combat operations entails a cross-cultural shift at the individual level. This movement is characterized as a psychological shift – from the military culture of the war fighter to the civil-military culture of the peacekeeper – with social, behavioral, psychological, and philosophical implications.¹¹⁶

Getso concludes with some recommendations considering special pre-deployment training for peacekeepers. The peacekeeping environment depends on peacekeepers' special adaptable features which help them to understand the intricate cultural “puzzle” of PSOs. Additional training will guarantee better co-existence and cooperation between actors in the field, thus improving the overall effectiveness of the peacekeeping force. An increased cultural awareness among “peace soldiers” will ultimately affect their cultural adaptation skills and encourage them to operate more actively and without constraints in the field. Pre-deployment training should be conducted in such a way that will assist the future peacekeepers in overcoming various cultural challenges they will meet in the peacekeeping environment. More details about aspects related to training for peacekeepers will be presented in the last section of this thesis.

...success in such operations [PSOs] will be determined by the degree to which all of the players can step outside of their individual cultures and value systems... surrender some of their autonomy, and seek the best, rather than the worst, in those with whom they must solve the problems they will confront.¹¹⁷

Efrat Elron and colleagues presented a very wide and, surprisingly, very positive picture of cross-culture interactions among peacekeeping forces.¹¹⁸ The authors also identified three main sources of misunderstandings and conflicts between peacekeepers connected with language and culture, transmission of orders and difficulties with trust among nations. Although they mention how destructive and disturbing cultural differences during peace support operations can be, they are primarily focused on the numerous advantages which can be produced by cultural diversities in peacekeeping.

¹¹⁶ Getso.

¹¹⁷ Andrew S. Natsios, “The International Humanitarian Response System,” *Parameters* 25 (Spring 1995), 81.

¹¹⁸ Efrat Elron, et al. “Cooperation and Coordination across Cultures in the Peacekeeping Forces: Individual and Organizational Integrating Mechanisms,” in Thomas W. Britt and Amy B. Adler (ed.) *The Psychology of the Peacekeeper*, Westport, CT: Praeger (2003).

Generally, the authors argue that at the individual soldier's level, there are many self-regulating mechanisms which help to overcome cultural barriers among nationalities.

As mentioned above, while Elron and colleagues admit that “differences in partner nationality and culture often lead to conflicts and misunderstandings that can limit the sharing of information and learning, which are crucial to the effectiveness of organizations,”¹¹⁹ they say that such diversities can be fruitful in producing positive outcomes within organizations. The authors explain that these positive outcomes can be achieved because increased levels of creativity, decision making and the enhanced range of cognitive reserves are all effects of the blend of cultures within the structure of the peacekeeping force. In addition, the authors suggest that individual skills, which are developed through experience, constitute an element which will contribute to the enhancing of coordination and cooperation between different actors in the peacekeeping field. The most desirable individual skill described by the authors is “intercultural competence” which, as they explain, is “the ability to relate effectively and appropriately in various cultural contexts.”¹²⁰ In detail, the set of skills must include features which should not only let the individual understand and see what is happening around, but also to react appropriately in every situation he/she can meet.

Elron, et al. describe in their chapter the most important and influential mechanisms which help in keeping the multinational and multicultural peacekeeping force together. Another objective for them was to suggest the most desirable individual skills which help in improving cross-cultural relationships, thus enhancing the effectiveness of the whole peace effort. “Cultural flexibility” and “military cosmopolitanism,” the two terms which can certainly be applied for the expected set of skills for CIMIC personnel, will be presented in the next paragraphs.

C. CULTURAL ISSUES AND CIMIC

Because of the nature of contemporary peace support operations and, as a result of demands created by the kinds of tasks which are usually conducted by CIMIC personnel, it is very important for CIMIC staff to possess a significant range of various skills which

¹¹⁹ Elron, et al., 262.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 266.

are necessary. General peacekeeping knowledge, staff and field experience, political and cultural sensitivity, and spoken and written communication skills are the features which should be the most desirable. Besides these skills, CIMIC personnel must be equipped in basic legal, logistical, public administration and engineering knowledge. Moreover, in connection with a multitude of various organizations present in the field, CIMIC should be great coordinators and facilitators of international efforts. Apart from this, there is also a great importance in individual skills such as interpersonal communication and openness, which enhance and enable them to conduct everyday tasks in the field.¹²¹

Culture awareness still remains one of the most relevant skills for CIMIC personnel. Because it is CIMIC's task to cooperate with different IOs and NGOs, CIMIC staff cannot escape from meeting new cultures in the field. Local authorities and individuals, with whom CIMIC officers have to deal very often, also represent different cultures, which can be overcome only by an increased level of cultural sensitivity among CIMIC staff. Durable and persistent peace transformation in the region highly depends on the level of local communities' understanding of the peacekeeping effort, thus demanding much better cultural preparedness of CIMIC personnel. The better understanding of PSOs by the belligerents that can be achieved, the greater chance there will be for peacekeeping forces to reach the mission's objectives. This can be only accomplished by fruitful and mutual communication between peacekeepers and local actors. So, this is the great challenge for those CIMIC staff who encounter different cultures, especially when they have to understand various culture-based assumptions and act based on reliable data and expertise. Thus, there is a great need for learning about local habits, and, by keeping in touch with local people, learning about lives and values that are characteristic in the region.¹²²

It will be very useful to present now the two key individual skills which seem to be particularly relevant for the job conducted by CIMIC officers in the peacekeeping environment. "Cultural flexibility" or "self-monitoring" and "military cosmopolitanism,"

¹²¹ Larry Wentz, "Civil-Military Operations" available at: http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf (last visited on 15 December 2006), 502.

¹²² Muddy Janssens, "Intercultural Interactions: A burden on international managers?," *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 16, 155-167.

as mentioned above, have been developed and suggested as very important for peacekeepers by Elron, et al. in “Cooperation and Coordination across Cultures in the Peacekeeping Forces: Individual and Organizational Integrating Mechanisms.”

Cosmopolitanism – is first of all a mindset that indicates an orientation toward the outside world, a willingness to engage with those who come from different cultures. It entails an openness toward divergent cultural experiences.¹²³

What is also relevant to the cosmopolitan behavior of peacekeepers is connected with personal abilities and competency, which improve cross-cultural communication through “listening, looking, intuiting and reflecting.”¹²⁴ Moreover, “cosmopolitanism” among peacekeepers should also guarantee that an individual will have the capability to see the particular situation from different points of view, acknowledging and accepting at the same time the differences that exist between people who come from different cultures. Such an approach will lead the individual to the accurate assessments of outcomes of cultural “clashes” that occurred in the past, happen currently and will happen in the future.

Elron, et al. also underline the importance of “cultural flexibility” or “self-monitoring,” “which is the tendency to regulate one’s own behavior to meet the demands of social situations.”¹²⁵ As they propose, the level of self-monitoring significantly rises in a culturally diverse environment. When individuals possess an appropriate point of cultural knowledge about the people they interact with, there is a much greater possibility that they will use it to adapt to the situation, thus increasing the probability of successful and fruitful communication. As a quoted Irish officer says: “It’s not they who have to change, it is you who have to change. And you have to be different for every single person.”¹²⁶ Thus, being flexible and possessing a suitable level of adaptation can be very crucial for peacekeepers, especially for CIMIC personnel who actively participate in various enterprises in the peacekeeping environment.

¹²³ Elron, et al., 274.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 272.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

D. CROSS-CULTURE COMMUNICATION – CIMIC APPLICATION

Marc Ascui, CIMIC Course Director at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in his “Culture Awareness”¹²⁷ module, broadly examined the influence and importance of cultural issues for CIMIC personnel. He noticed the crucial role of culture in conflict resolution, and suggested that without necessary cultural awareness preparation, CIMIC staff will always encounter difficulties and misunderstanding while conducting their activities in the peacekeeping field. Generally, as Ascui argues, “communication is a vehicle for the CIMIC Officer to overcome”¹²⁸ challenges connected with cultural barriers existing between the military and civilian components of international relief organizations. Indeed, studying and learning different cultures and getting familiar with foreign languages, can play an essential role in the conduct of CIMIC activities, contributing to the increased effectiveness of peacekeepers and the whole peacekeeping effort.

Similarly to the proposition of Tamara Duffey in “Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping” presented earlier, Ascui also suggests dividing the cultural knowledge, which is essential for understanding of its role, into three dimensions existing in contemporary peacekeeping. From his point of view, the reality of current international interventions demands that communications be treated from a culturally relevant perspective on three levels:¹²⁹

- communications among various parts of the peacekeeping force, which usually come from different countries;
- communication between the military and civilian organizations like IOs and NGOs, which always participate actively in bringing humanitarian relief to those in need; and
- relationships between the military and civilian actors comprising the peacekeeping force and various civilians such as local authorities, tribal leaders, companies or individuals.

¹²⁷ Marc Ascui, “Cultural Awareness” in Cedric de Coning (ed.), *CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations*, APMC Programme, ACCORD March 2006, available at: <http://www.accord.org.za/cimic/manual.htm> (last visited on 16 December 2006).

¹²⁸ Ibid., 252.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 250-251.

Ascui also reminds us, in the same way as Duffey, that if we want to fully appreciate the role of culture in peace support operations, two approaches must be made – an internal and external. First, internal communications exist between cultural “military puzzle” and civilian actors comprising peacekeeping forces. Second, externally, there are interactions between all peacekeeping personnel, both military and civilian, and the locals. Only by being aware that cultural interactions in PSOs take place between internal and external communities, will it be possible to identify the sources of misunderstandings and build the bridges which allow fruitful communication and enhance the effectiveness of the peacekeeping effort.

The reality of contemporary peacekeeping, as Ascui asserts, brought significant changes not only considering the ways in which missions are organized and conducted, but also considering the repertoire of skills needed for managing the coordination between numerous actors in the field. Moreover, besides many problems connected with ambiguous mandates, logistics, planning and control, “the international peace operations community has failed to consider the importance of culture.”¹³⁰ Thus, for better understanding of the two communities, the civilian and military, Ascui developed a chart that determines main organizational culture differences that contribute to various misunderstandings and conflicts between these two “different worlds.”¹³¹

¹³⁰ Ascui, 252.

¹³¹ Ibid.

MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE	CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
The military is a conservative, hierarchical organization.	Aid workers tend to be liberal – in terms of appearance, attitude towards authority, etc.
Soldiers are legally bound to follow the direction of superiors (when lawful orders are given).	Leaders are often younger, and have more authority devolved to them than military counterparts at similar levels.
Decision-making authority is often retained at high-levels and needs to pass through several chains of command.	Civilian agencies and NGOs have a longer-term approach; they are often present before the military deploy, and will still be around after the military has withdrawn.
As the military is a last resort, and a very costly option, it is often deployed as late as possible and withdrawn at the earliest opportunity.	Actions are based on experience and lessons learned rather than on SOPs and doctrine.
	Within an organization, sub-offices are not necessarily responsible to offices of the same organization in the capital. Some may have specialized functions and different reporting lines.
	Civilian agencies tend to coordinate amongst themselves through a consensus-seeking model rather than a command model.

Table 2. Ascui's chart comparing organizational cultural differences between military and civilian actors

E. PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION'S ENVIRONMENT – ESSENTIAL CULTURAL INDICATIONS FOR CIMIC PERSONNEL

Not only politicians and those who plan peacekeeping missions, but also civilian organizations and the forces that carry it out all comprise the peacekeeping environment. There are also various local actors such as local authorities, companies, tribal leaders and individuals who constitute an important background, a field on which aforementioned players act. Only by finding proper communication channels between the force and local population can the expected mission's objectives be achieved. Following Ascui's "Hints to Develop Cultural Awareness,"¹³² the next paragraph will discuss basic behavioral skills that might be helpful in "breaking" the cultural walls by peacekeepers:

- It is important to approach every new situation with an "open mind." In other words, transferring experiences from one country to another does not ever guarantee a success; our memory and various prejudices should not affect contemporary activities.
- Arriving at the place, we have to be aware of the historical background of conflict in the area. Knowing the political and historical situation significantly increases the probability of better understanding and fruitful conduct of the assigned mission.
- While working in the field, we should be interested in everything new that surrounds us. By showing interest in local people's behavior, culture and habits, we systematically increase our knowledge what can result in enhanced perceptive abilities and increased job effectiveness. Moreover, by respectfully asking questions about the local environment, the military proves its interest in the country, thus strengthening its credibility and trust among local communities.
- When we face problems, we should not hesitate to ask questions of our companions. It is always better to share our doubts with someone else; also, it might be very helpful to hear someone else's opinion.
- While participating in various conversations, it is crucial to make sure that we understand things properly. Again, by asking questions we make things clear and show a real interest in the issue.
- It is also important to pay special attention to our stereotypes. While acting in the international environment and cooperating with different nationalities and diverse cultures, we should treat our partners and the way they conduct their work respectfully. Indeed, if we show our respect towards someone else once, we will be treated with respect in return.

¹³² Ascui, 253.

- It is highly recommended to learn basic common words of the locally used language. Such a small effort can significantly increase our job's effectiveness in the field. By saying even the simplest words in somebody's home language we can break the wall, build trust and gain sympathy. Knowing foreign language we clearly demonstrate our respect and care for the country and its citizens; also, under some circumstances, basic foreign language knowledge can facilitate conflict resolution. An example concerning CIMIC officers' preparation training for the KFOR mission in Kosovo presented by Wentz in "Civil-Military Operations" greatly reflects and confirms this:

The language training included participation in a five-week language training course in either Albanian or Serbian. The language training included some instruction on basic aspects of the social culture in which the soldiers would find themselves. Some soldiers with Hispanic background actually picked up Albanian quite quickly once in country. Once onsite, the fact that soldiers were trying to learn basic language skills had positive effects of helping to break the inner barriers of the local Albanian and Serbian cultures.¹³³

F. REAL-LIFE CIMIC FIELD CULTURAL EXPERIENCES

Cultural awareness may bring many advantages to peacekeeping forces. Increased cultural awareness among peacekeepers, especially among CIMIC personnel, can produce advanced interest in the mission, encouraging them to engaging in various peacebuilding activities in the local societies, which normally, without cultural preparation, would be very impaired. What is also very important, peacekeepers who are more population-oriented and significantly accustomed to the local society, may constitute a very successful preventative body, particularly against terrorists or insurgents acting in the area. Better knowledge of the locals can drastically restrain the actions of those with anti-peace motivations. Appropriately culturally sensitive peacekeepers can become caring "neighbors who want their adopted societies to prosper. They will create social conditions that encourage and enable the belligerents to undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding activities that avoid violence."¹³⁴ Moreover, CIMIC staff should constitute the bridging body which will successfully close the gap between the military, civilian relief organizations, and local civil institutions which are being rebuilt.

¹³³ Larry Wentz, "Civil-Military Operations" available at: http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf (last visited on 15 December 2006), 501.

¹³⁴ Kimmel, 65.

Effectively acting CIMIC personnel can significantly contribute to the systematic decrease in the number of coalition forces acting in the field, with no negative impact on the whole peacekeeping effort. Thus, the spectacular activities conducted by well prepared CIMIC staff can even contribute to the shortening of presence of peacekeeping forces in that area.¹³⁵ So, to increase the understanding of the huge role that CIMIC plays in contemporary peacekeeping, it will be very helpful to provide some short real-life stories related to CIMIC field experiences taken from Kosovo and Iraq.

Larry Wentz in “Civil-Military Operations” described in detail the actions of CIMIC and CA tactical support teams (TSTs) which operated in the area as part of KFOR peacekeeping force in Kosovo. As a great example of the effectiveness of CIMIC/CA activities he presents how CIMIC/CA, by conducting its job, changes attitudes toward peacekeeping forces. Mainly because of the great involvement of CIMIC/CA TSTs in small quick impact projects in the local area, Serbian lack of trust and cooperation significantly changed within a year. As Wentz underlines, “the local population attitude changed substantially, especially in the Serbian communities.”¹³⁶

Another bright example, this time more specific, also taken from Wentz’s paper, talks about problems connected with potatoes. When the local Serbian farmers were experiencing great problems with selling about 200 tons of potatoes picked the previous fall, they contacted the CIMIC TST acting in this area. CIMIC immediately managed to contact the local agricultural supply coordinator in Vitina who arranged the sale of over 40 tons of potatoes to Albanian community. What is the most important aspect of this story – is that it was the first time Albanians bought Serbian products in such large amounts.¹³⁷ Albanians did not care who planted the potatoes, they bought them because they needed them. The story also illustrates how it is sometimes simple to achieve consensus between belligerents when there is a well operating CIMIC unit in the area.

¹³⁵ Thomas Mockaitis, R., “Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo,” *Small Wars*, May 2005, available at: <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/mockaitis.pdf> (last visited on 15 December 2006).

¹³⁶ Larry Wentz, “Civil-Military Operations” available at: http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf (last visited on 15 December 2006), 494.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 496.

In Iraq, spring 2006,¹³⁸ the official visit of one of the CIMIC TSTs at the house of the local tribal leader followed routinely – it started with some nice words in the local language and the host asked his guests to drink tea with him. One of the Polish CIMIC team members, in trying to be polite, praised the tea-kettle that the tribal leader was using. The host then offered it to him. The CIMIC officer was not prepared for such an offer and gently refused. The next day, the tribal leader came to the camp gate and brought the kettle with him – still insisting to give it to the officer. When the CIMIC unit member refused again, explaining that although it was very nice but it was also too precious, the man completely change his attitude. Since that day, the relationships between them significantly deteriorated, which also had an impact on the rest of the team because the tribal leader was an important element of the CIMIC-local society communication net. In fact, the kettle was not expensive, but because it would cause many transportation problems for the CIMIC officer, he decided not to take the gift. As he was informed later, under such circumstances, in the local culture, it is highly recommended to take the present. Small gifts and favors from both sides mean little in and of themselves, but they can become priceless and very fruitful during future relationships.

The last situation shows how it is sometimes important to sit, drink and talk with the locals first, and then proceed to business. CIMIC tactical support teams were visiting various places such as local authority's offices, tribal leader's houses, police stations, courts and prisons, etc. every day. During one of the visits at the refugee camp in the vicinity of Al-Kut, the TST members were invited to the camp leader's tent to discuss their basic needs. Having in mind earlier experiences of being offered tea or other cold drinks, only one team member decided to drink the water straight from the bucket standing in the tent. As appeared very soon, the camp's leader talked only to the team officer who joined him drinking water from the bucket. In conclusion, sometimes it is

¹³⁸ The next two stories were described by CIMIC officers from the CIMIC Group Center in Kielce, Poland. The factual information has been sent via e-mail. The CIMIC unit has been actively participating in numerous quick impact projects in the South-Central part of the country since summer 2003. The efforts of CIMIC units, especially CIMIC TSTs acting in the field proved to be very important in building trust in stabilization forces among local populations, also, playing the leading role in communication between the local authorities, tribal leaders and society from one side, and the military from the other.

worth acting against everything that we have been told during the preparation training; from time to time, in order to achieve a basic level of trust, certain rules have to be broken.

Cultural awareness knowledge is fundamental to CIMIC personnel acting in the peacekeeping environment. Fruitful and smooth cooperation are less likely without knowing how international and local organizations operate and what the main protocols and cultural practices within those communities are. Although culture itself does not guarantee a peacekeeping success, it is of great importance to keep the level of cultural awareness on the appropriate level, especially among CIMIC personnel who actively participate in various activities taking place among numerous elements of the “cultural puzzle” outside of the military installations.¹³⁹ Because culture proves to play an important role in the contemporary peacekeeping operations, and because the international community largely fails to recognize this fact, it will be crucial in the foreseeable future to consider lessons learned and create training which will prepare peacekeepers properly.

Communication skills, especially negotiation and the use of interpreters by CIMIC officers will be presented in the next sections. Because specific communication skills which are important for CIMIC personnel in the field are, as it was in the case of culture, particularly apparent during tactical level activities, divagations about negotiation and interpreters’ issues will also be underlined by using real-life examples taken from operations in Kosovo and Iraq.

¹³⁹ Ascui, 249.

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V. NEGOTIATION – AN IMPORTANT TOOL FOR CIMIC

A. NEGOTIATION SKILLS FOR CIMIC PERSONNEL

The principle of non-use of force except in self-defense is central to the concept of United Nations peacekeeping... any problem between UN peacekeepers and [parties directly concerned] can be resolved peacefully by negotiating and persuasion, and therefore the use of force becomes unnecessary and counterproductive.¹⁴⁰

Considering the conditions under which CIMIC personnel conducts their tasks in contemporary peacekeeping missions, it must be admitted that communication is much more challenging than it is under standard circumstances. In a strange environment, under often stressful situations, CIMIC officers have to deal with various organizations and individuals who belong to different cultural backgrounds daily. Such conditions, contrary to the duties conducted in home countries or during peaceful times, demand special communication and negotiation skills preparation for CIMIC staff.¹⁴¹ This section will briefly develop the idea of negotiation and how it can affect the effectiveness of activities performed on a daily basis by CIMIC personnel in the peacekeeping environment. In addition, there will be some fundamental negotiation guidelines provided which should give the audience a basic understanding of negotiation, and maybe, encourage them to do some additional research on negotiation. In the last paragraphs of this section, similarly to the sections devoted to culture and work with interpreters, there will be several real-life stories presented. The real-life examples taken from Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan should both support the proposition that situations which demand negotiation skills on CIMIC/CA personnel are very common, and increase the level of understanding about the importance of negotiation skills training for CIMIC/CA officers. Overall, the purpose of this section is to explain how important it is to understand the value of negotiation and its unlimited possibilities for practical implementations by CIMIC/CA officers acting in the multicultural peacekeeping environment.

¹⁴⁰ Getso.

¹⁴¹ Cedric de Coning, "Negotiation Skills" in Cedric de Coning (ed.), *CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations*, APMC Programme, ACCORD March 2006, available at: <http://www.accord.org.za/cimic/manual.htm> (last visited on 16 December 2006), 231.

B. NEGOTIATION – THE DEFINITION OF GIVE AND TAKE

Indeed, the statement that “negotiating today is one of the least understood arts in human affairs”¹⁴² seems to be very realistic. Despite the fact that these words were written years ago, they are just as relevant today. As a result of the demands of modern international reality, we have negotiation courses of study offered and many great books have been written to help learn negotiating and influencing skills. However, to approach the negotiation process and to understand it completely requires getting involved in real negotiations. Everyone negotiates every day, usually without any awareness. To improve negotiating skills, basic negotiation strategies have to be known, then they have to be verified and put into action in ongoing practice in the field. But what exactly are negotiations?

One of the many definitions of “negotiation” was developed by Brad McRae in *Negotiating and Influencing Skills*. The author suggests that “negotiating is taking place any time two people are communicating, where one or both parties have a goal in mind.”¹⁴³ Very similar opinions are shared by Roger Fisher, Bruce Patton and William Ury, the authors of *Getting to Yes*:

Negotiation is a basic means of getting what you want from others. It is back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed.¹⁴⁴

As it was shown, both sources point out that there are at least two basic factors for negotiating to exist, first, there must two sides with a “goal in mind,” second, the sides have to communicate. Thus, looking at these definitions, even for a person who is not an expert in a field of semantics, it is obvious why the negotiation process is so difficult to understand. Communication skills which are always bounded by cultural differences and disparities in goals may always cause conflicts. Learning about cultures, understanding new specific training demands and applying completely innovative skills can be very challenging for the new generations of peacekeepers.

¹⁴² G. Nierenberg *Fundamentals of Negotiating* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1973), XI.

¹⁴³ Brad McRae *Negotiating and Influencing Skills* (SAGE Publications Inc, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1998), V.

¹⁴⁴ Roger Fisher, William Ury, Bruce Patton *Getting to Yes* (Houghton Mifflin Company, NY, 1991), XVII.

Although every negotiation is different because of the diversity of goals and types of communication skills implemented in action, the basic element remains the same. Learning and applying negotiation skills is surely a very difficult and time-consuming process, but a well prepared and experienced negotiator can effectively face every tense conflict situation which would be especially helpful for CIMIC personnel. An individual who is adequately prepared and experienced in communications and negotiations is just as valuable to the military as a perfectly equipped, trained and experienced individual in combat.

C. IMPORTANT NEGOTIATION SKILLS FOR PEACEKEEPERS

Contemporary peacekeeping operations take place in diverse environments. Many civilian actors such as local authorities, International Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations or even the individuals (local elites' leaders or local contractors) influence the array of actions performed by the military forces. Described conditions have arguably changed the basis of contemporary peacekeeping, and underlined the importance of CIMIC units.¹⁴⁵

W. Hansen, O. Ramsbotham and T. Woodhouse, the authors of *Hawks and Doves: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution* point out that, since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping has undergone substantial changes. They underline “the significance of conflict research and theory building for peacekeeping practice.”¹⁴⁶ The authors determine the importance of “specific skills and the training necessary for contemporary peacekeeping missions, focusing especially on the contribution to conflict resolution.”¹⁴⁷ According to their opinions, the new features introduced by contemporary peacekeepers

¹⁴⁵ Stuart Gordon “Understanding the Priorities for Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC),” *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, posted 13 July 2001, available at: www.jha.ac/articles/a068.htm (last visited on 15 December 2006).

¹⁴⁶ Wibke Hansen, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse *Hawks and Doves: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management (August 2004). Available at: http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/hansen_etal_handbook.pdf#search=%22hawks%20and%20doves%20peacekeeping%20and%20conflict%20resolution%20hansen%22 (last visited on 15 December 2006), 2.

¹⁴⁷ Hansen, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2.

should be, for example, techniques of promoting good communication, negotiation and mediation. These “consent-promoting techniques constitute the soft skills,”¹⁴⁸ and are not the usual skills exercised by soldiers.

So, considering current peacekeeping missions’ demands, and having now a much better understanding of the spectrum of CIMIC activities, it must be underlined that a more broad and innovative communication and negotiation training for peacekeepers should be encouraged. Also, because of the nature of the tasks performed by CIMIC personnel in the peacekeeping environment locally, this special training should be provided not only for soldiers from upper levels of command, but especially for those acting at the tactical level.

Deborah Goodwin in *Negotiation in International Conflict* broadly developed the idea of negotiation in peacekeeping and clearly underlined the crucial role negotiation plays in contemporary peacekeeping, especially on the lowest, tactical level of operations. “Recent deployments have shown the greater emphasis towards conciliation and consent in ‘operations other than war.’ The importance of diplomacy in negotiation at every level of command is an essential tool...”¹⁴⁹ The truth is that armed forces around the world seem to review and rebuild training programs so as to educate modern soldiers in the critical business relating to people and communication skills. “The act of persuading people that it is better to live peacefully than to survive in the state of war, that it is more effective to work together towards a common good than to kill each other, is only really effective at the grassroots level, which is where our soldiers operate.”¹⁵⁰ Indeed, only by putting greater emphasis on activities within the local communities and by creating an increased socio-political awareness among local people, the peacekeeping forces can achieve the mission’s objectives and set the groundwork for an enduring peace in the region.

¹⁴⁸ Hansen, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 9.

¹⁴⁹ Deborah Goodwin *Negotiation in International Conflict* (Portland, Frank Cass, OR 2002), XIII, the words of MAJ. GEN. A.G. Denaro CBE.

¹⁵⁰ Goodwin, XIII.

The increasing importance of negotiation as a dispute-resolution technique has been clearly stated in Deborah Goodwin's book. She also points out that "to date there has been little investigation of the nature of tactical level negotiation and the way in which this duty is impacting upon the responsibilities of the serving soldier."¹⁵¹ And, again, the vision of a universally trained soldier-negotiator seems to be very hard to achieve. The diversity of conflicts existing around the world and multiplicity of parties involved in a conflict, cause negotiation to be very difficult, and make negotiation different at various levels of command.

Cultural context within which those negotiations are taking place is of a great importance. Often the meaning of negotiation is totally different among countries with different cultures. It is crucial in cross-cultural communication, as Coning explains, to pay a special attention to the matters related to culture and, primarily, to respect different cultures under every circumstance. "If you are professional, humble, friendly and respectful, your chances of not offending anybody are very good."¹⁵² Ignorance of the cultural differences may cause further clashes not only between belligerents but also between peacekeeping forces and host parties.

In the reality of contemporary international interventions, soldiers, especially CIMIC/CA officers who actively fulfill their tasks outside the military compounds, must accept the new rules of engagement and adapt new essential communication and negotiation skills. "Modern mandates often require the protagonist to use negotiation as a first resort and armed force as the last."¹⁵³ Looking back at the history of UN interventions, peacekeeping politics sometimes fails. As Duffey argues, today's peacekeeping strategies should be built on more culturally-based considerations. Contemporary international peacekeeping efforts must constitute more balanced approaches where both top-down and bottom-up policies would be implemented. "Current peacekeeping policy is culturally insensitive, focusing predominantly at the top level of diplomatic negotiations and the prescription of 'quick-fix' Western processes and

¹⁵¹ Goodwin, XV.

¹⁵² Coning, 235.

¹⁵³ Goodwin, XIII.

institutions.”¹⁵⁴ Explaining that complicated phenomenon of international intervention in a culturally different environment and focusing particularly on the lowest level of operation could be very interesting and deserves wider investigation and explanation.

D. BASIC GUIDELINES ABOUT NEGOTIATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

CIMIC officers act on a daily basis as a link between peacekeeping forces and the civilian environment. Because encountering people who represent various organizations and communities is often connected with both informal conversations and formal negotiations (sometimes organized as formal meetings), having at least basic knowledge about negotiating techniques constitutes an essential toolbox for CIMIC personnel.¹⁵⁵ Unfortunately, as Goodwin suggests, soldiers are not usually trained to conduct such activities as negotiation or mediation, because it does not fit into the normal range of skills expected of them. Because of the nature of the traditional soldier’s training and war-related tasks, and because in today’s peacekeeping missions the spectrum of skills expected for soldiers has dramatically increased, military negotiators’ performance is limited and impaired.¹⁵⁶ Compared to the professional civilian negotiators who have appropriate bargaining training, military *micro-negotiators*¹⁵⁷ suffer from a lack of proper skills and are forced to acquire their practical skills by, very often, painful field experiences. Moreover, conditions under which peacekeepers operate are completely different and more disturbing to the course of negotiations, which can produce even greater damage for an unprepared and inexperienced military micro-negotiator.

Soldiers are professional combatants, not professional negotiators, who are placed in a chaotic and dangerous working environment. Within this environment they must ply their trade, diverse as it is, with only a brief pre-operational negotiating training, if they are lucky.¹⁵⁸

Additionally, as Goodwin explains, the negotiating activities conducted at the lowest, tactical level by junior level CA officers, together with their outcomes, may have

¹⁵⁴ Duffey, 163.

¹⁵⁵ Coning, 232-233.

¹⁵⁶ Goodwin, 79.

¹⁵⁷ The term *micro-negotiator* was introduced by Goodwin.

¹⁵⁸ Goodwin, 79.

a significant impact not only on the negotiating counterparts, but also on other peacekeepers, and, even more relevant, on higher levels of operations. The nature of CA activities requires additional capabilities which let the soldiers on the ground act at higher levels of competence than they are usually expected. Indeed, decisions and actions taken on the tactical levels of operations, surely affect the environment above and beyond.¹⁵⁹

To understand the importance of negotiations and improve individual's problem solving skills it is necessary to know the basics and roots of conflict. The next section discusses the causes of conflict and suggests various approaches for how the conflict can be explored and resolved.

E. CAUSES OF CONFLICT

Bernard Mayer in *The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution* argues that in order to understand the need for conflict resolution, negotiation or mediation, we should first examine the roots of conflict. He suggests that at the center of all conflict are human needs. People fight because they either have some goals which can be achieved in the course of conflict or because their needs are incompatible with the needs of others.¹⁶⁰ Mayer also explains that there are five basic forces which constitute the main sources of conflict among people: "communication, emotions, values, the structures within which interactions take place, and history."¹⁶¹ It will be very helpful to discuss shortly how these factors can ignite conflicts.

Emotions: Emotions, as Mayer asserts, are the fuel for conflicts. Because it is in peoples' nature to let emotions lead their actions, conflicts arise very often. Emotions can be produced by either current events or negotiation process, or by previous experiences or prejudices. What is most important, emotions do not let people focus on seeking an easy and peaceful way to meet their needs, but force them to focus on their counterparts' strong and violent positions which very often lead to the escalation of the conflict. Under circumstances where emotions play a leading role and both parties' abilities to seek a

¹⁵⁹ Goodwin, 80.

¹⁶⁰ Bernard Mayer, *The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution*, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco 2000, 8.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 9.

successful solution are significantly impaired, it is very important to look for the third party intervention. This is why the role of contemporary peacekeepers is very important.

Values: Conflicts based on values, Mayer explains, are especially difficult to resolve. This is because values constitute the set of beliefs about “what is important, what distinguishes right from wrong and good from evil, and what principles should govern how we lead our lives.”¹⁶² Values comprise peoples’ identities, which lie very deep in their nature. When people feel that their values are under attack, it often means for them that they are under attack. Though values often play an important role in a conflict’s arising they can also prevent further escalation. This can be achieved by seeking common values by both parties; this approach can lead to more collaborative solutions and finally to the stable resolution of the conflict.

Structure: Structure is the environment, the frame in which communication takes place. Resources, various procedures, time limitations, communication procedures, even material settings can constitute the elements of a structure. In certain situations, even if both parties may represent a constructive and collaborative approach to conflict resolution, the elements of structure are so restraining that they lead to the escalation of this conflict.

History: Dealing with conflicts we have to consider their history and previous interactions between conflicting parties. History can have a great influence on the course of each conflict because, as it was in the case of emotions, it can act as fuel for conflict escalation. As Mayer suggests, it is impossible to fully understand the conflict without knowing its historical roots.¹⁶³

Communication: Mayer explains that people are very imperfect in communication. Conflicts arise very often even when there are no significant disagreements between parties but when there are problems with smooth communication. Factors such as culture, gender, age, class or environment, can all have an enormous influence on the individual’s effective communicative skills. Moreover, when parties try

¹⁶² Mayer, 11.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 13.

to communicate under difficult conditions, or they try to send their messages under emotionally hard circumstances, the effective communication is usually considerably impaired.

Generally, communication skills are the most important in the area of conflict resolution. Fortunately, Mayer says, “communication skills can be learned, applied, and enhanced.”¹⁶⁴ In addition, there is nothing more important in communication than the intentions of both parties in the conflict. Commitment, even while opposing parties meet many difficulties and make various mistakes in the course of communication, can contribute to the successful and constant conflict resolution.

F. LISTENING

The skill of listening, concentrating on what is being said, as well as what is not being said, can prove to be enormously helpful in negotiation.¹⁶⁵

Listening is very important for good communication to exist. It is crucial that every negotiator develop listening skills – the basis for good communication. Especially in a peacekeeping environment, within a complicated cultural *mélange*, when there is a particular need for showing interest in what is being said, careful listening can contribute to fruitful and quick reconciliation. By being a good listener, an experienced negotiator learns many things about counterparts; the history of the conflict; and others’ positions, attitudes, strategies and expectations. In addition, he clearly demonstrates his respect and openness, which can significantly improve the atmosphere in which negotiations take place, creating a supportive groundwork for finding solutions.

Mayer also develops so called *listening to connect* and *listening to debate*.¹⁶⁶ The first kind of listening may serve as a great tool in seeking common ground between negotiating parties, whereas the other kind usually leads to more competitive approaches pursued by the conflicting sides. *Listening to connect* seems to be more appropriate and relevant for the purposes of peacekeeping because it leads to the solutions achieved through common understanding. This approach presumes that both sides to a conflict try

¹⁶⁴ Mayer, 119.

¹⁶⁵ Nierenberg, 49.

¹⁶⁶ Mayer, 127.

to comprehend the positions and interests of the others, seeking the solutions that will allow them to achieve some goals jointly. Such an approach highly promotes mutual understanding and sets the basis for peaceful reconciliation.

G. SEPARATE PEOPLE FROM THE PROBLEM

The basic approach is to deal with the people as human beings and with the problem on its merits.¹⁶⁷

Fisher, et al., in *Getting to Yes* proposed several relevant approaches which should constitute a set of basic guidelines for every negotiator. One of the initial propositions of the authors is the separation of people taking part in disputes from the problem which always accompanies the case. The first, very important fact which is necessary for understanding this approach is to be aware that the people who are involved in negotiation are only human – meaning that they will be guided by their emotions, various values, diverse backgrounds and viewpoints, which often make them unpredictable. Thus, it is highly recommended to pay enough attention – to be more sensitive towards other people's problems. If we fail to understand and introduce this human approach, it would become very harmful to the whole negotiation process.¹⁶⁸ As soon as we manage to separate people's feelings from the matter of negotiation, it will become clear how to work out the solution which would be satisfying for both parties. Because sometimes only human perceptions block the agreement, when we decide to move them aside or understand another's position, it may become apparent that both parties share the same goal.

Communication plays a crucial role in this approach. A good negotiator has to learn various listening skills and paraphrasing techniques and be prepared to ask questions. The more we listen and the more we speak about ourselves, the greater is the chance for achieving an agreement. It is also important to have the abilities of “speaking to be understood” and “speaking about yourself, not about them.”¹⁶⁹ In order to improve relations in the course of negotiations we have to try to create an atmosphere which will

¹⁶⁷ Fisher, et al., 39.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 19.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 35-6.

help the parties feel like they are talking to a friend to work out an agreement in a joined effort. That kind of behavior will improve the negotiation atmosphere and help to clearly define how the others see the problem.

H. FOCUS ON INTERESTS NOT POSITIONS

You can hardly expect the other side to listen to your interests and discuss the options you suggest if you don't take their interests into account and show yourself to be open to their suggestions.¹⁷⁰

This approach suggested in *Getting to Yes* belongs to the key rules which are commonly applied in the course of negotiations. To explain the meaning of “interests” and “positions” Fisher, et al. use a simple example, a story about two men quarreling about the window at the library. They were bargaining how to leave it open. Finally, the librarian helped to solve the problem by asking each of them why they want to have the window closed or open. After discovering that one party needs some fresh air and another wants to avoid a draft, the librarian opened the window in the next room solving the problem very easily.¹⁷¹

Thus, it becomes clear what “interests” and “positions” are: the former are the main motivators for people, they are major issues hidden behind people's choices and behaviors; the latter are something that we have decided upon, things which are consequences of our interests. So, the point of this approach is to have the ability to look at people's interests not positions where possible. Such a technique will help to reveal the real issues behind human behavior, facilitating the finding of satisfying solutions and achieving agreements.

I. BATNA

The idea of BATNA which is the “Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement”¹⁷² also belongs to the key set of abilities that can have an essential influence on negotiation. In detail, BATNA is the second best alternative, another possibility in case the first negotiation fails. Fisher, et al. asserts that one of the most important actions taken before negotiations is a determination of our own and the other's BATNA. Why is

¹⁷⁰ Fisher, et al., 55.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 40.

¹⁷² Ibid., 97.

BATNA so crucial? The answer seems to be straightforward. Having our BATNA developed, while we are sitting at the negotiating table and discussing possible solutions, we keep an additional “ace up our sleeve.” What is equally important, when we know our negotiation partner’s BATNA as well, it gives us a pretty good picture about what is happening around the negotiating table.

The more you can learn of their alternatives, the better prepared you are for negotiation. Knowing their alternatives, you can realistically estimate what you can expect from the negotiation.¹⁷³

The best possible situation is when our BATNA is much stronger than the BATNA of our counterpart. Such circumstances let us remain relaxed in the course of negotiation, and give us much greater control over a negotiated issue. As the authors of *Getting to Yes* explain, “the better your BATNA, the greater your power.”¹⁷⁴ Indeed, it is in our best interest, as it is suggested in the case of having a much stronger BATNA than our negotiating partners, to show our BATNA to the others. Such an approach can significantly soften our counterparts. On the contrary, under the circumstances when our BATNA is much weaker than the other side can expect, it is highly recommended not to reveal it.

J. PREPARATION FOR NEGOTIATION

Coning differentiated several main circumstances under which CIMIC officers can face negotiation situations in the field, these include:¹⁷⁵

- negotiating freedom of movement;
- various discussions about the roles and relationships between the military and belligerents or local authorities;
- resolving disputes; and
- discussions or negotiations which take place during official meetings.

Each of these situations can be described as tactical level negotiations and needs a different approach. However, according to Coning, there are some guiding principles which determine a successful negotiation:¹⁷⁶

¹⁷³ Fisher, et al., 105.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 102.

¹⁷⁵ Coning, 234.

- Proper understanding of a mandate and the whole peacekeeping effort (military interest);
- Preparation of strategies;
- Careful and detailed knowledge about other parties;
- Thinking beyond and predicting future steps of the others; and
- Full understanding of the historical/cultural background.

As it was shown, the aforementioned factors, which contribute to the success in negotiation, mainly refer to the preparation phase of a factual negotiating process. Indeed, preparation is essential to effective negotiations. The higher the level of your preparation, the greater are your chances of achieving consensus. “Do your homework” – this is how Gerard I. Nierenberg starts his discussion of the negotiation preparation phase,¹⁷⁷ underlining the importance of solid preparation for every negotiation. Doing homework, Nierenberg asserts, should be composed of several relevant steps: knowledge about me, knowledge about the past, detailed knowledge about counterparts, and careful planning of strategies. Although the author suggests that all these factors are important, he clearly puts more emphasis on gathering information about our counterparts in negotiation. “You should be prepared with every possible kind of information about the people with whom you are going to negotiate.”¹⁷⁸ Thus, even while gathering essential information about our partners in negotiations can be very difficult considering the nature of peacekeeping operations, getting familiar with only basic information can prove to be very helpful in the course of bargaining. Unfortunately, what has to be admitted is that many of the micro-level military negotiators have to negotiate ad hoc, without any preparation. This fact makes the work of military negotiators very difficult. In such situations, Coning explains, the individual’s negotiating skills and basic knowledge of the history of the conflict, cultural background, as well as soldier’s field experience can prove to be very helpful and make facing unexpected negotiations less challenging.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ Coning.

¹⁷⁷ Gerard I. Nierenberg, *The Art of Negotiating*, Cornerstone Library, New York 1981, 47.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 50.

¹⁷⁹ Coning, 237.

Not only knowledge about me is important, understanding our counterparts' interests in negotiations is equally crucial. Focusing on our partners can help us better understand their positions, which can result in smoother negotiations. Sometimes, it can be very supportive when we try to be in our "counterpart's shoes," or if we think about what motivates them; such techniques provide us with an additional knowledge about the others, helping to shape our negotiating approaches.¹⁸⁰ It is much better to sit at the negotiation table well prepared. The awareness of having done the homework can significantly increase a negotiator's abilities to act effectively. It is also important to react quickly to a changing situation in the course of negotiations. It happens very often in bargaining, that our previously chosen negotiating strategy needs to be changed. "Therefore it is important to be constantly on the alert for new developments."¹⁸¹

K. IMPROMPTU SITUATIONS

The following situation happened in 2004 in central Iraq where the Polish CIMIC Tactical Support Teams (TSTs) were operating.

The main task of my TST was to support the local Iraqi Police Forces and all the prisons and detention centers in our JOA. Our job was to conduct some basic restoration works and provide various supplies for the police stations, prisons and detention centers in the area. According to the rule – "when it is possible, do not do it using military assets, let them do it" we were arranging all the restoration works and supplying tasks with close cooperation with local Iraqi contractors recommended either by the authorities of the province or by our predecessors. We had an unexpected visit in our camp one day. Two police stations' chiefs together with the contractor that was supplying their precincts came to us to quarrel about the equipment they were receiving. One of them did not like the TV set's brand that the contractor provided him; he argued that the other police station got a much better one. Anyway, first, for us (CIMIC guys) it was a complete shock – How, for God's sake, can they ask for the better TV, while they are getting everything for free??? (In our culture such behavior would be very, very unusual). But, we understood that probably in this case this is not only the question of a brand but a matter of prestige, a case of which police station is more important. So, because the exchange of the TV sets was impossible, we decided to solve the problem in a different way. The guy who was dissatisfied with his TV got a sofa kit of a much

¹⁸⁰ Technique proposed by Chester L. Kerrass in *Give and Take*, HarperCollins, New York 1993, 2, 120; see also Fisher, et al., 23.

¹⁸¹ Nierenberg, 49.

better quality than his companion from the other police station, and it worked! They all walked away very happy. (TV sets and large and comfortable sofa kits constitute an ordinary equipment of every precinct in Iraq)¹⁸²

Considering the nature of CIMIC activities, we must realize that CIMIC personnel will not have the opportunity to conduct solid preparations for negotiation every time. There are many unexpected situations which demand special and sensitive approaches; situations that demand the application of various techniques used in negotiations. Such circumstances require at least basic theoretical knowledge of negotiation. Also, using common sense and field experience can be very profitable.

In this case, rather than focus on “this seems crazy” the CIMIC tried to understand the interests of the parties in conflict and what was contributing to the conflict. By identifying prestige and equity as concerns, the CIMIC officer was able to negotiate a solution.

Another story includes basically similar problems. But, this time the issue was solved in a different way:

When we (CIMIC TST) wanted to negotiate with the managers of the local medical clinic about the equipment they wanted, only the beginning of the meeting was nice. After a while, they wanted more and more, not understanding that we had our priorities and limitations as well. As we began to see that the agreement might be threatened and that the people were difficult to talk to, we decided to ask our and their superiors to make a deal. So, we arranged a meeting between our brigade commander and a local Iraqi Governor. The brigade commander explained for us what we wanted and what exactly could be delivered for the clinic. The Iraqi Governor informed the clinic managers without discussing with them, and the case was over.¹⁸³

As exemplified, there are situations that are really difficult to resolve even when they look very simple. The aforementioned story suggests that it is sometimes better to withdraw from a difficult dispute and to try to engage people with greater influence. In

¹⁸² The story was described by CIMIC officer from CIMIC Group Center in Kielce, Poland. Translated from Polish. An e-mail message to author, October 2006.

¹⁸³ Although the source remains the same, this situation took place in 2006 in Wasit Province.

this circumstance, considering the nature of the military involvement in the case, it was relatively easy to ask higher authorities for assistance and to reach agreement.

The following story took place in Afghanistan. This is how a CA Team Leader described his negotiating experiences with local people:

In the spring of 2004, I was deployed to Afghanistan as a Civil Affairs Team Leader. I was working with a tribe in the Pashtun area. One night, the unit that I was supporting heard of some Taliban in one of local villages. They sent out a combat patrol and began a search of the village, house by house. As an American entered a house, he saw a man reach for a rifle and point it at him, so the American fired, believing he was about to be shot. The Afghan did not know who was entering his house was only trying to protect his family. Hence, this was an accidental killing. It was my job to talk with the family of the slain Afghan and his tribal elders to “fix” the situation. This particular tribe had been very sympathetic to our presence in Afghanistan (all of the local workers on our base were from this tribe) and this incident strained relations. I had to convince the locals that this was a mistake and to negotiate for their continued support. I met with the family and local village elders. I worked with the base leadership, from a different unit than the one I was supporting, and was able to secure jobs for the deceased man’s brother and cousin, thereby providing income for the deceased’s family.¹⁸⁴

This story has several important aspects like respecting Rules of Engagement (ROE), an individual soldier’s cultural awareness preparation, communication and language skills preparation, and finally CA involvement. For the purpose of this section, only the last will be touched upon.

As shown, when the accidental death of a villager significantly deteriorated previously good relations between the local community and the military, commanders decided to send the Civil Affairs Team to explain the unfortunate event to the tribal elders and the family of the deceased man. Indeed, no one knows better than Civil Affairs personnel working among the local population every day about the local tribal relationships, behaviors, habits and way of living. Thus, only CA staff can become locally operating negotiators and conflict resolution facilitators.

¹⁸⁴ The information came from a CA team leader via an e-mail message to author, November 2006.

The next CIMIC field experience took place in Kosovo and was described by Larry Wentz in “Civil-Military Operations.” The events were connected with violent riots in Kamenica: about 3,000 Albanians unhappy with a situation in the local area started throwing rocks at Russian forces. This is how Wentz described the reaction of the local TST:

TST members supporting [the Quick Reaction Forces] team intervened and were able to calm the situation by negotiating with Albanian leaders they knew. Getting to know the villages, their residents, and particularly the leaders, cannot be underestimated. TST members were quite effective in building local trust relationships and legitimizing the commitment of KFOR.¹⁸⁵

Wentz describes, in detail, the involvement of TSTs and its role in KFOR’s peacekeeping efforts. By giving examples of successful negotiations performed by CIMIC personnel in urgent situations, he underlines the crucial role that CIMIC can play in the area in which it operates. CIMIC acts in the civilian environment on a daily basis. The task of CIMIC staff is to meet, discuss and help local communities in many ways, thus creating a positive image of the peacekeeping force and setting the groundwork for conflict resolution and constant peace in the region. What is equally important, because CIMIC officers usually know the most influential individuals in local communities, they can prove very helpful in resolving unexpected displays of animosities in the area. Quick and effective local conflict resolution may become one of the main tasks for CIMIC personnel. CIMIC knowledge about the local environment and its ability to negotiate cannot be undervalued. Thus, CIMIC personnel must, with no doubt, be equipped with at least basic negotiation knowledge and practice.

The presented real-life stories connected with everyday CIMIC/CA field experiences exemplified and underlined the following points:

- How important it is for peacekeeping forces to maintain a high involvement of CIMIC units in locally based activities;
- How beneficial CIMIC knowledge about local environment can be, when we consider its practical implementations in locally performed negotiations and conflict resolution; and

¹⁸⁵ Larry Wentz, “Civil-Military Operations” available at: http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf (last visited on 15 December 2006), 499.

- Knowledge about conflict resolution and negotiation including practical skills must obviously belong to the necessary “toolbox” of CIMIC/CA personnel.

L. WORKING WITH INTERPRETERS

Cultural interpreters help peacekeepers become knowledgeable and well prepared to take part in the customs and activities of the country they are working in by improving experience and confidence in dealing with their counterparts and in respecting and observing their main customs and practices.¹⁸⁶

1. Interpreters – CIMIC Application

Because the case of interpreters covers both culture and negotiation in peacekeeping, there is a separate section in this thesis which is particularly devoted to the role of interpreters in the peacekeeping setting, especially in CIMIC activities. The nature of contemporary United Nations’ interventions concerning their multicultural and multilingual environment, causes major communication problems internally, between the elements of peacekeeping forces, and externally, between the elements comprising the whole UN community working in the field and the local population. According to its function, CIMIC’s main task is to provide fruitful communication between the military and local communities, communication, which would play a dual role: to support the main task of the mission’s commander and to the support local community. CIMIC personnel can fulfill their goals only when it is possible to communicate with the local society, which normally speaks a different language. Thus, it is crucial for CIMIC staff to understand the importance of interpreters, and know the basic rules of how to use them in the most efficient way. This section will briefly describe some details of interpreters’ work, present practical guidelines for the realistic use of interpreters, and, by showing several field examples, illustrate how important and challenging the cooperation with interpreters can be.

¹⁸⁶ Edwards.

2. Local Interpreters – Advantages and Disadvantages

It is common practice to employ local people as language assistants to work with CIMIC officers in the field,¹⁸⁷ which can be both fruitful and damaging for the communication processes. The following paragraphs will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of such cooperation.

a. Advantages of Cooperation with Local Language Assistants

No one knows the local environment better than the locally hired interpreters. Local language assistants know the composition of the local society, the history of existing conflicts within local communities, habits, tribes, influential individuals, etc. Moreover, as Edwards explains, because of the high stress hampering second language skills among peacekeepers, which is characteristic of peace operations, and under particularly sensitive conflicting circumstances, it is very important to reduce the likelihood of interpretive misunderstandings by hiring local interpreters.¹⁸⁸ Local language assistants act as cultural liaisons between the two parties. Only an individual from the local community can fully recognize the sensitivity of the local environment and help to solve problems which would be impossible for an outside interpreter or the military alone to solve. Thus, the best way to fully understand the local environment and to minimize the amount of misunderstandings during CIMIC activities is to employ a local language assistant.

Employing locals increases trust, improves cooperation and enhances the whole picture of activities conducted by peacekeepers in the eyes of local people. In war torn countries, where the unemployment rate is usually very high, such actions contribute to major improvements of the living standards of the locals. Even if such jobs are only temporary, they significantly improve cooperation between the peacekeeping forces and the local communities. Providing jobs and showing the belligerents the right way to live peacefully can constitute a very good beginning for the creation of an enduring peace and reconciliation in the country.

¹⁸⁷ Cedric de Coning, “Working with Interpreters” in Cedric de Coning (ed.), *CIMIC in UN & African Peace Operations*, APMC Programme, ACCORD March 2006, available at: <http://www.accord.org.za/cimic/manual.htm> (last visited on 16 December 2006).

¹⁸⁸ Edwards.

While there can be a wide variety of local languages, the local language assistant will know the right one. Various nationalities, communities and tribes which often live in the same area, commonly use different languages. The best way to get the message through properly is to cooperate with local language assistants.

Local language assistants are usually well educated people who may have a great influence in the local community; considering their education, they are also usually much respected people in the local environment.¹⁸⁹ Thus, creating fruitful cooperation with the local language assistants can contribute to the positive news and opinion transmission about various CIMIC activities conducted in the area, and about the whole peacekeeping effort in the country.

In spite of the vast differences in the skills of translators and interpreters, there is one thing that they must share, besides deep knowledge of both languages: they must understand the subject matter of the text or speech they are translating. Translation is not a matter of substituting words in one language for words in another. It is a matter of understanding the thought expressed in one language and then explaining it using the resources of another language.¹⁹⁰

b. Disadvantages of Cooperation with Local Language Assistants

The main problem with locally hired language assistants is the lack of professional preparation. This does not mean that they lack language skills or are not willing to work; it is mainly connected with the lack of practical training and field experience which can significantly impair the effectiveness of their performance. Larry Wentz in “Peace Support Operations: Cooperation, Coordination, and Information Sharing: Lessons from Kosovo” noticed the existing problems related with communication and with locally hired interpreters. He points out that in Kosovo, “locally employed interpreters sometimes explained rather than translated, or added their own spin, and required careful monitoring.”¹⁹¹ Indeed, local interpreters are usually difficult to control; they often forget about translation, make their job a usual chat with the others

¹⁸⁹ Coning, 247.

¹⁹⁰ Edwards.

¹⁹¹ Larry Wentz, “Peace Support Operations: Cooperation, Coordination, and Information Sharing: Lessons from Kosovo” available at: http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf (last visited on 15 December 2006), 693.

completely forgetting about their tasks and taking over the conversation. Such behavior requires more patience and strict monitoring of their work which results with losing focus on the meeting's objectives.

This is how a CIMIC officer from the Polish TST describes the cooperation with the local interpreter in Iraq, Babil Province:

The use of an interpreter is an art. Trust your interpreter and control your interpreter. Locals were very useful interpreters because of their knowledge of the culture and tradition, but they tend to take over the conversation. I had to balance between politeness and effectiveness in using the interpreters. Moreover, counterparts not used to working with interpreters, tend to make their statements very long, which were lost in translation. In the beginning, I always asked for short sentences (which was rude) and forced my interpreter to interpret before the counterpart finished (even more rude), because otherwise I would have lost most of the conversation.¹⁹²

Wentz also suggests some practical solutions that were implemented in Kosovo, when the military had problems with the local language assistants. He asserts that in some circumstances it can be very useful to use another language which is known by both parties, even if both sides know just the basis of that language. What happened in Kosovo was that some officers had been using German or Italian when they were speaking to the locals. While they spoke only a little German and Italian, the whole practice helped to establish more direct relationships with locals, thus improving the whole communication process.¹⁹³

Not surprisingly, the Polish CIMIC personnel in Iraq reacted similarly to the problems with local interpreters. Tactical support teams had to deal with locally hired contractors who provided various supplies and conducted numerous quick impact projects in the local environment. The role of the interpreters became very important. So when, in some cases, the use of local language assistants appeared to be more problematic, CIMIC officers started speaking English, which was possible because,

¹⁹² Information obtained from a Polish CIMIC officer who participated in two rotations in the stabilization mission in Iraq (2003 and 2005) and had a great field experience in working with local community. The message sent via e-mail, September 2006.

¹⁹³ Wentz, 693.

fortunately, most of the local engineers had been well educated and knew basic English. Moreover, as in the case of Kosovo, direct communication led to more close relationships between the military and local community, and had a very positive impact on the smoothness of CIMIC activities conducted in the region.¹⁹⁴

Societies in war-torn regions are often especially divided. Seeing a language assistant from one belligerent group assisting the military may produce feelings of mistrust or even hostility among the others. This issue is particularly difficult when we consider the nature of ethnic conflicts. Very often, because of deeply rooted animosities and various biases within different groups of the local society, finding and using an impartial language assistant can become very problematic. As Wentz noticed, it is often the role of the military to convince the locals that the main objective of the mission and all its components (including locally hired interpreters), is to bring stability and an enduring peace to the region regardless of ethnicity. Such explanation, Wentz says, was especially difficult in the areas where the use of an Albanian interpreter provoked hostilities.¹⁹⁵

3Finding a neutral language assistant is also difficult; it is normal that an employee from one tribe will favor his comrades. Thus, one of the three major features of the local language assistant, according to Edwards, along with language “proficiency” and “competency”, is “unbiased attitude.”¹⁹⁶ Indeed, biased interpreters can significantly influence the communication process. While an impartial, local interpreter can contribute to the improved effectiveness of military activities, his biased attitude can severely damage civil-military relations, and even deteriorate the interior relations between local communities.

3. The Use of Interpreters by CIMIC Personnel – Practical Hints

The intelligence, personality, and street smarts of an interpreter can be crucial in helping you convey your point across linguistic and cultural barriers. The interpreter is your local specialist in public relations. An

¹⁹⁴ Obtained from Polish CIMIC officer, an e-mail information, September 2006.

¹⁹⁵ Wentz, 692.

¹⁹⁶ Edwards.

interpreter can give you suggestions on the best way to proceed with a person from a different cultural background, and may notice nuances that would otherwise be overlooked.¹⁹⁷

Cedric de Coning in “Working with Interpreters,” underlined the importance of the role of interpreters in CIMIC activities, and introduced several main guidelines that can be helpful in facilitating work with interpreters in the field. According to Coning, an appropriate cooperation with an interpreter should consider:

- We should be respectful of the country, people, and religion, and never show disrespect toward these things in front of our local language assistant. It is important to appreciate the role of interpreters as “ambassadors” of the local communities and to have in mind, that those individuals, because of their education, are especially respected among locals. In addition, it is advised not to look at the interpreter during the conversation, but to make eye contact with our counterparts. This way, we show respect, understanding and a great interest in what is being said.
- Because local language assistants do not have professional training, it is useful to brief them before the actual job starts; basic explanations about how he should behave and what will be the main message of the meeting are very helpful for every interpreter.¹⁹⁸ The interpreter should also be told where to stand or sit during his job. Moreover, the local language assistant must know that he should not provide an evaluation of what is being said, but an interpretation of the factual message. Although, where required, the interpreter should provide cultural context in addition to the translation, he must be instructed not to make evaluations, assumptions or analyses.
- As a result of the lack of training for the interpreters, CIMIC officers must be aware of common misunderstandings in culturally sensitive environments. So, as Coning suggests, it might be very helpful to broadly use paraphrasing and repeat the messages. Such a policy can assure both sides that the discussed issue was properly understood. Thus, it is also important to reserve more time than was previously planned for meetings, mediations or negotiations.¹⁹⁹
- Every language is very specific. There are numerous cultural “undertones” or complicated idioms which can be easily misinterpreted. So, to make the interpreter’s job easier and more accurate and effective, it is suggested to use short sentences; also, avoiding idioms, jargon or technical language.

¹⁹⁷ Edwards.

¹⁹⁸ Coning, 246.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

- In addition, although humor is usually helpful and practiced, it does not always break the cultural boundaries very easily. Using humor in communication we must be aware that what is very entertaining for us can produce even offensive reactions among the others.
- Coning also points out the role of body language in communication. Working with the interpreters or without, we have to be aware that we transmit messages even when we are not speaking. The same gestures often have different meanings in different cultures, often causing misunderstandings. However, as Coning suggests, “a smile will never be misunderstood,” and “a polite handshake between people from the same sex will be accepted in most cultures.”²⁰⁰

Indeed, working with interpreters is an art, truly. There may be many other guidelines presented about how to make the interpreter’s job more effective and easier. For CIMIC personnel, it is very important to understand the role that interpreters play in the contemporary peacekeeping environment. Even without professional training, local language assistants can be very well equipped and appropriately briefed by CIMIC staff before every meeting, mediation, negotiation or simple conversation. Briefing and field experiences can significantly improve the effectiveness and efficiency of an interpreter’s work. Moreover, CIMIC personnel must understand that a locally hired interpreter, as a specialist in local relations and cultural background, can constitute a crucial element in communication between the military and the local communities in peacekeeping operations.

²⁰⁰ Coning, 245.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. IMPROVING COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

In November (1995), we had never heard of CIMIC, we had no idea what you did... now we can't live without you.

Admiral Leighton Smith,
Commander, IFOR, April 1996²⁰¹

Much has been done in the field of civil-military relationships in peacekeeping since the early 1990s when, as pointed out in “Civil-Military Cooperation, Lessons Learned and Models for the Future,”²⁰² because of a common lack of trust and reluctance to cooperate, many things went wrong. Nowadays, as a result of worldwide acceptance and understanding, CIMIC constitutes an integral and necessary part of every peacekeeping force. However, while international organizations and individual governments accepted the vital role of CIMIC and provided additional education and training for CIMIC personnel, there is still much to be done to achieve the maximum effectiveness of CIMIC units and to improve coordination and cooperation in the field – the necessary conditions for accomplishing the mission's objectives.

As it was suggested by General Christian Hvidt during the opening of the CIMIC conference in Copenhagen, it is not only the military who should be blamed for the lack of cooperation and coordination in peacekeeping operations. He explained that the other side of “the CIMIC equation – the civilian side”²⁰³ is also responsible for problems with synchronization of their efforts. This was mainly the result of huge differences in organizational directives, lack in coordinating the objectives and diversity in operational procedures. And, what is the impact of such a situation in the peacekeeping field? Hvidt argues that meeting various International Organizations and Non-Governmental

²⁰¹ Colonel William R. Philips, Chief, Civil-Military Cooperation, SHAPE, “Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to Peace Implementation in Bosnia,” *NATO Review Online* (Vol. 46-No. 1 Spring 1998), available at: <http://www.shape.nato.int/docu/rev-pdf/eng/9801-en.pdf> (last visited on 6 January 2007), 24.

²⁰² Jakobsen (ed.), “Civil-Military Co-operation, Lessons Learned and Models for the Future,” Danish Institute of International Affairs, Copenhagen, 2000, 5.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 6-7.

Organizations in the JOA is not a new phenomenon for the military. What really causes confusion and limits the effectiveness of the military efforts is the complexity of the whole peacekeeping environment, which significantly influences the ways in which the military fulfills its tasks. This is the role of Civil-Military Cooperation; this is the place where the peacekeeping force has to rely completely on CIMIC support to provide fruitful interactions between the civilian and military worlds.

Besides the need for increased cooperation among civilian organizations acting in the field, as Hvidt proposes, education and training requirements for both the military and civilians are also encouraged. Improved knowledge of the peacekeeping environment among peacekeepers and civilians together with joint exercises will significantly increase mutual cultural awareness, thus contributing to major improvements in fulfilling real tasks in the field.

1. Joint Planning, Training and Liaison Officers

Education and training are essential to producing unity of effort in the field. Personnel exchanges, joint courses, and combined planning can occur without compromising the integrity of either the military or humanitarian missions.²⁰⁴

Coordination and cooperation between the military and civilians in peace support operations are still a significant barrier. “It is still difficult engaging with the staff of international organizations and NGOs...This is a two way problem.”²⁰⁵ Integrated training for civilians and military personnel constitutes another crucial element which could significantly increase the effectiveness of civil-military cooperation. During the Paris Conference on “Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding” on 2 June 2006, it was noticed that “NATO military planning does not systematically integrate external non-military actors, as there is currently no doctrinal basis for broadening actor participation in the planning process.”²⁰⁶ Apparently not much has been done during the last four years since the NATO CIMIC doctrine AJP-9 was approved. The AJP-9 clearly explains that to

²⁰⁴ Mockaitis, 35.

²⁰⁵ J.W. Rollins, “Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in Crisis Response Operations: The Implications for NATO, *International Peacekeeping*, 2001, 8(1), 128.

²⁰⁶ *Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding: A Round-Table Discussion*, Conference Report Prepared by Kate Noble, available at: <http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/pdf/pb-report.pdf> (last visited on 13 November 2006), 16.

“understand the skills, knowledge and capabilities of IOs and NGOs it is necessary to maintain relationships with them prior to entering an area of operations, and to educate them through military schools and courses which incorporate integrated training.”²⁰⁷ Indeed, including civilians in military mission preparation training, and conversely, inviting the military to participate in humanitarian mission arrangements could enormously improve civil-military cooperation and its ultimate effectiveness during the mission.

Dr. Michael C. Pugh also notices problems with communication and effective cooperation not only between the military and civilians but also among civilian organizations themselves.²⁰⁸ He suggests that the main obstacle responsible for the impaired coordination in the peacekeeping environment is the complete fragmentation of organizations, tasks and perceptions existing in the civilian domain of operations. Permanent exchange of information, as he proposes, can be one of the main factors contributing to increased cooperation in the field. CIMIC centers, where the representatives of numerous actors meet, can serve as a great opportunity for such information exchange. Moreover, Pugh underlines, liaison officers should constitute an additional factor which would strengthen cooperation and decrease the influence of cultural differences between organizations. Liaison arrangements should take place between the military components and lead civilian organizations, but, just as crucial, various civilian agencies must also dispatch their liaison personnel among each other.

B. EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR CIMIC PERSONNEL

Considering the nature and importance of CIMIC activities conducted in the contemporary peace support operations, an appropriate level of individual’s preparation must be underlined. CIMIC personnel often face unpredictable situations. It is not always possible to quickly find solutions. Adequate knowledge about the environment, an appropriate level of cultural awareness and individual sensitivity will usually help one in approaching problems in the correct way. “Thus, the effectiveness of the military team on

²⁰⁷ AJP-9, 8-6.

²⁰⁸ Michael C. Pugh, “Reviewing the problems and lessons learned in the nineties: A civil perspective,” in Jacobsen, 17.

the ground ultimately comes down to the quality of the participants.”²⁰⁹ Indeed, specific tasks performed by CIMIC officers demand the engagement of soldiers with additional abilities. So, countries which contribute their CIMIC soldiers to various peacekeeping operations should provide them with sufficient knowledge and practical training.²¹⁰

Achieving fruitful communication between the military, civilian agencies and host country actors is not possible without appropriate culture awareness and training for CIMIC staff. Unfortunately, as Last suggests, the lack of a unified effort and mutual understanding of capacities between the military and humanitarian communities causes peacekeeping missions to be very ineffective.²¹¹ While military contingents can reach local communities very easily, they lack crucial peacebuilding skills, especially those including communication, culture, language and relationship building. Peacekeepers receive very little training considering local culture. Most of the information they get comes from talks with others peacekeepers, books, and newspapers; the official cultural preparation training is usually very limited.²¹² On the other hand, civilian organizations, which are usually present in the area for a longer time, have these cultural and language resources but lack the assets to allow them reach the local communities, because of security, for example.

Close cooperation and fruitful exchange of information between the military and civilian agencies which operate in the JOA can positively influence the outcomes of the whole peacekeeping effort. Defining military and civilian priorities, finding common goals and introducing mutual support during various field tasks when needed will be a good way to make the civil-military relationship better. The Australian contingent, for example, before deployment in Somalia, not discussing the overall effects of the mission, took advantage of the knowledge of a relief organization that had been acting there earlier. The military consulted with the NGO CARE in order to get some additional, practical insights concerning the area in which they were to be deployed.²¹³

²⁰⁹ Wentz, 503.

²¹⁰ See major recommendations for CIMIC in Holshek, 306-307.

²¹¹ David Last, “Organizing for Effective Peacebuilding” in Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 87-88.

²¹² Duffey, 150.

²¹³ Ibid., 157.

1. Cultural Awareness

CIMIC officers acting in the field are responsible for maintaining good relationships between the peacekeeping force and the local environment. Fruitful cooperation with civilian agencies, local authorities, tribal leaders and individuals constitutes an essential element that significantly contributes to the achievement of the mission's goals. Peacekeepers, especially CIMIC personnel, must pay more attention to the local culture. Respect for local habits and knowledge of the history of the conflict in the region and of sources of clashes between belligerents, all matter in maintaining good civil-military cooperation. Unfortunately, peacekeepers often lack cultural background preparation, which drastically damages the communication between the forces and local communities.²¹⁴ Thus, education and cultural training for peacekeepers plays an important role in the contemporary PSOs. Because CIMIC personnel perform their activities in a culturally different host country environment, it is particularly important to intensify cultural education and training for CIMIC staff.

Peacekeepers need training in cultural awareness to help them, not only with the combatants, but also with local customs, meaningful contacts with citizens and other peacekeepers, and being good role models. Without such training, the peacekeepers' own primordial sentiments and ethnocentrism are aroused, making them part of the problem rather than part of the solution.²¹⁵

Culture awareness can play a vital role for CIMIC personnel. CIMIC activities cannot be performed without a significant level of understanding of the local culture. Cultural awareness training programs and intercultural communication activities should constitute an integral part of peacekeepers training,²¹⁶ especially for those to be deployed with CIMIC units. Soldiers acting within the peacekeeping environment should be equipped with the necessary knowledge concerning primordial emotions shared by the conflicting parties. Without solid cultural preparation, the CIMIC job can become impossible or considerably hampered. Thus, as Kimmel suggests, cultural awareness training should be conducted in three phases:

²¹⁴ Duffey, 151. See also Elron, et al., 278-279.

²¹⁵ Kimmel, 62.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

- First, education and training before deployment, in the countries contributing peacekeeping forces;
- The second phase should be organized in a common place, near the actual location of the mission; and
- The third part of the training would be performed in the field. People learn best through real experiences.

Soldiers with an increased level of cultural awareness feel less “limited,” which would help them in a more active cross-cultural performance in the field. An adequate cultural preparation will surely facilitate smooth relations with IOs, NGOs and various local players. This, in turn, will appreciably improve the image of the military, creating good conditions for an enduring peace in the region.

Victoria Edwards in “The Role of Communication in Peace and Relief Mission Negotiations” also notices the importance of cultural training for peacekeepers. Among the issues mentioned earlier, she explains, additional and concrete cultural training for soldiers taking part in PSOs should be encouraged. She argues that peacekeepers will be much more efficient if the trainings equip them with detailed knowledge of the country in which the mission is taking place. Things like “gift-giving practices, social and business dress, religious practices and holidays, dining and shopping, schooling and banking, and more subtle cultural differences, such as forms of discourse, basic values, ethical beliefs, and the rites and rituals”²¹⁷ constitute an integral part of each culture, which, when learned, will extensively help peacekeepers in conducting their mission. These “small” cultural nuances cannot be ignored; they are especially important for CIMIC personnel whose culturally sensitive performance should constitute one of the main strengths.

Contemporary peace support operations which apply procedures built on foreign cultural assumptions concerning conflict resolution, and which do not take into account the cultural background of the host country, substantially weaken the performance of the whole peacekeeping efforts.²¹⁸ Indeed, although a culturally sensitive peacekeeping approach on the tactical level of operations is being discussed in this thesis, it is

²¹⁷ Edwards.

²¹⁸ De Coning, 256.

important to notice that culture matters enormously on each level of operations. Politicians, strategists, IOs' and NGOs' managers, as well as higher military ranks, should all be culturally aware.

2. The Importance of the Media

Because positive media coverage can significantly support peace processes undertaken by the international community, media constitute an important element of the peacekeeping environment. Communication with the media and the way they provide the news considerably influences host country communities. Indigenous societies need to know about what is being done in their country, and what the mandate and the main objectives of the military mission are.²¹⁹ Thus, Public Affairs offices (PAOs), which work with every peacekeeping operation nowadays, need to build necessary and permanent communication bridges to keep the local and international audiences well informed. Looking at CIMIC, it must be underlined that because its activities usually take part within the local environment, CIMIC personnel should be encouraged to play a complimentary role in the relations between PAOs and civil society. Meetings with local authorities, tribal leaders and individuals, and quick-impact, reconstructive infrastructure projects conducted by CIMIC usually attract media attention. On such occasions, it can dramatically improve the image of the military presence among native citizens, thus contributing to major improvements in the whole peacekeeping effort.

CIMIC personnel should cooperate closely with public information offices to keep the audience well informed about their activities in the region. Because the international peacekeeping force often lacks the appropriate level of knowledge about the media and how to deal with them, it is crucial to introduce additional courses and training for soldiers to improve the individual's communication skills.²²⁰ Moreover, this issue particularly concerns CIMIC units. Considering the nature of CIMIC performance, CIMIC staff must be aware that the media will permanently accompany them in the field. Thus, what is of great importance for effective and fruitful communication is that CIMIC officers must be equipped with necessary interviewing skills. Sufficiently prepared

²¹⁹ De Coning, 263.

²²⁰ See The Challenges Project, 239; and "Media and the Military," Joint Services Warrant Officers' Course, 7-2.

CIMIC staff will effectively transmit the military message to both the local and international audience and will improve the image of the peacekeeping effort appreciably.

3. CIMIC and Interpreters

Considering its core functions, CIMIC's main task is to provide fruitful communication between the military and local communities, communication that would play a dual role – to support the main task of the mission's commander, and to support the local community. CIMIC officers can fulfill their goals only when it is possible to communicate with the local society, which usually uses a different language. Thus, it is essential for CIMIC staff to understand the importance of interpreters, and know basic policies about how to use interpreters in the most efficient way.

While working with interpreters is an art and needs continuous practice, knowing basic “hints” about how to work effectively with interpreters will radically improve CIMIC's performance. For CIMIC officers who act within the local environment, it is even easier to understand the important role that interpreters play in the contemporary peacekeeping environment. As was suggested earlier, even without professional training, local language assistants can be very well equipped and appropriately briefed by CIMIC staff before every meeting, mediation, negotiation or simple conversation. An interpreter's performance as a result of field experience will systematically improve over time. In addition, detailed briefings before the actual interpreting job can make the interpreter's work better, as well. CIMIC personnel must understand that a locally hired interpreter, as a specialist in local relations and cultural background, comprises an important element in facilitating smooth communication between the military and the local communities in contemporary peacekeeping operations.

4. Using Negotiations

Successful peacekeeping soldiers must function well in environments where only minimal force is usually required. Under these circumstances, their strength lies not in their lethality but rather in their ability to negotiate and make compromises.²²¹

²²¹ Robert A. Wisher, “Task Identification and Skill Deterioration in Peacekeeping Operations” in *The Psychology of the Peacekeeper*, Thomas W. Britt, Amy B. Adler (ed.), Praeger, Westport and London, 2003, 92.

In spite of the fact that negotiations constitute one of the most difficult skills for individuals to develop, CIMIC personnel must admit that having at least a basic negotiation background can noticeably improve their communication in the field. The nature of CIMIC field responsibilities is such that CIMIC officers face situations which demand the use of negotiation on a daily basis. Besides official and planned meetings, negotiations are often impromptu. Considering the stress caused by the uneven and often hostile environment in which peacekeepers act, smooth and effective communication can be very difficult. Additionally, because of the multicultural composition of the contemporary peacekeeping environment, cross-cultural communications with elements of negotiation greatly complicates interpersonal relationships. Thus, as mentioned above, the range of issues that can significantly hamper communication and negotiation in peacekeeping is very wide. So, one of the necessary ways of minimizing the negative influence of the peacekeeping environment on interpersonal communication, must be a development of fundamental conflict resolution and negotiation skills among peacekeepers. The more peacekeepers know about conflict resolution and negotiation styles, the less problems they will meet in the field and the better they will perform.²²²

Negotiation skills should constitute one of the core elements that peacekeepers are being taught.²²³ It is especially important for CIMIC personnel who encounter various negotiating situations while conducting their field activities. There is also another crucial fact about CIMIC and negotiations. As a result of a permanent presence within the local communities, CIMIC officers are usually the only ones who know diverse nuances concerning indigenous societies. The most influential people inside the local communities, tribal leaders and finally local authorities, all accompany CIMIC personnel on a daily basis. So, as was shown in the chapter devoted to negotiation issues, it is often the role of CIMIC staff to resolve local conflicts, which arise often in a war torn, fragile society. Negotiation and basic conflict resolution skills can prove necessary and very helpful under such circumstances.

²²² See Lakshmi Ramarajan, Katerina Bezrukova, Karen A. Jehn, Martin Euwema, and Nicolien Kop, “*Successful Conflict Resolution Between Peacekeepers and NGOs: The Role of Training and Preparation in International Peacekeeping in Bosnia*,” IACM 15th Annual Conference, January 2002, available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=305206> (last visited on 9 March 2006).

²²³ The Challenges Project, 239.

5. CIMIC Officers – Grassroots Diplomats

There is no effective cooperation without good communication. Indeed, because cooperation and coordination are the key expectations for CIMIC, communication between the multiple actors in peacekeeping environment plays a vital role for CIMIC personnel. Deborah Goodwin undoubtedly agrees with that statement. She argues that communication skills belong at the center of the skills needed for CA units for effective work in the contemporary peacekeeping environment. “The ability to understand different organizational, societal and national cultures is critical to the success of communicating in a multinational and multi-organizational environment.”²²⁴ So, as she suggests, even when CA officers have a great understanding of the mandate and a great set of other skills necessary for activities related to peace support operations, the final goal of the mission cannot be achieved without adequate communication abilities. CIMIC/CA personnel must possess a necessary set of communication skills, which are essential for building effective and smooth cooperation with the civilian “world.”

Among the necessary set of skills which will allow the peacekeeper to act in the international, interdisciplinary and multicultural peacekeeping environment, CIMIC officers should also display additional talents which are more related to a diplomatic repertoire. Looking more closely, being outside a military compound, meeting and dealing with a multitude of various actors and resolving and negotiating local conflicts, CIMIC personnel act like military diplomats who represent not only the UN’s power or Mission Commander’s will, but also the countries they come from.²²⁵ Thus, some additional features of an individual’s personality such as “high morale, initiative, tact, patience”²²⁶ and increased cultural sensitivity are highly encouraged. Indeed, CIMIC staff act as tactical level military ambassadors who play and will continue to play an essential role in building stable and enduring peace in peace support operations around the world.

²²⁴ Goodwin, 92.

²²⁵ For the idea of grassroots diplomats see United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Training*, 12.

²²⁶ The Challenges Project, 236.

Because the available literature exclusively concerning the effectiveness and efficiency of CIMIC units and individuals in contemporary peace support operations is very limited, it is difficult to determine whether CIMIC personnel are adequately equipped with communication skills for their missions. Thus, additional research that would examine CIMIC pre-deployment training and its effectiveness in the peacekeeping environment is recommended. However, looking at the available literature which analyzes training and efficiency aspects of peacekeepers as a whole, it is clear that soldiers taking part in PSOs still suffer from insufficient individual skills which significantly influence their effectiveness. So, it may be asserted that the level of CIMIC's staff preparation, especially in the matters of communication skills such as dealing with the media, cooperation with interpreters, cross-cultural communication styles and the use of negotiation, also needs major improvements.

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